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Introduction and Summary
Over the past years, financial markets were hit by two crises: the global financial crisis
of 2007 - 2009 and the subsequent and currently ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the
Eurozone. Initiated by the bursting of the housing bubble in the United States, the
global financial crisis led to a strong economic downturn worldwide. During the crisis,
US GDP fell by nearly 5 percent from December 2007 to June 2009. Likewise, US
employment declined by 8.8 million between January 2008 and February 2010. Taking
into account projections for cumulative US output losses associated with the financial
crisis, estimated costs amount from several trillion USD to more than USD 13 trillion.1
Without an intervention by governments and central banks, this crisis might have had
catastrophic consequences for the world economy.
However, we will never know these “what ifs” as central banks promptly responded to the
financial crisis in order to reestablish interbank lending. In addition to cutting interest
rates, central banks used and still use unconventional policy measures such as Quantita-
tive Easing (QE), Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), or extending the list
of assets eligible for collateral (European Parliament, 2012).2 Furthermore, governments
tried to strengthen the financial sector by providing aid to financial institutions. With
its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), the US government invested a total of USD
245 billion in assets and equity of financial institutions (US Department of the Treasury,
2013). In the European Union, between 2008 and 2011 EUR 1616 billion were used to
support financial institutions, either by recapitalizing banks to increase their solvency or
by granting guarantees to enhance liquidity (European Commission, 2012). These gov-
ernment expenditures made in support of the financial sector were one of many reasons
1See US Government Accountability Office (2013) for an examination of financial crisis losses to the US
economy, including data on GDP decline and projections for cumulative US output losses. For US
employment data, see Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011).
2While QE is an asset purchasing program, LTROs provided liquidity to banks for periods of up to
three years. In addition, in 2012 the ECB announced its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
program with its potential engagement in the secondary markets for government bonds.
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for the subsequent and persistent sovereign debt crisis in Europe.3
In an attempt to identify the sources for the financial crisis, the US Senate entrusted its
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations with the matter. This US Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations (2011, p. 1) concluded that the financial crisis was
“the result of high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; and
the failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the
excesses of Wall Street.” The committee found that in recent years financial markets
changed in several dimensions. For example, banks became larger and more complex.
This alters a lot. As a bank’s probability to be bailed out by the government is found
to increase in bank size, large firms are likely perceived as too-big-to-fail.4 This boils
down to an implicit government guarantee for large banks, results in moral hazard and
provides incentives for excessive risk-taking.5 In addition to the change in bank size,
the committee also attested that banks set up financial instruments that were difficult
to analyze, and, above all, they faced lax government regulation. In combination, these
factors resulted in a highly dangerous mixture that can be seen as one of the main drivers
of the financial crisis.6 In 2008, this mixture forced governments to quickly support banks
as stated above.
Furthermore, in response to the financial crisis, governments have taken manifold ini-
tiatives, temporary or permanent, to reform the financial sector. Their motivation was
threefold: governments wanted (i) banks to take a share in the realized rescuing costs, (ii)
reestablish stability of the financial industry, (iii) prevent future crises. To reach these
goals, governments started initiatives that included and still include regulatory standards
for financial institutions and means of taxation.7
Regarding regulation, major reforms such as the agreement on Basel III rules and, on
the European scale, the introduction of the European banking union, aim at strength-
ening resilience and stability of the financial industry (Bundesministerium der Finanzen,
2014b). While Basel III is meant to strengthen bank capital requirements and will be
fully put into effect by 2019, the European banking union is a framework for a single
3For a discussion of other explanations for excessive public debt and reform possibilities, see Konrad
and Zschäpitz (2010).
4By analyzing financially distressed firms across industries and countries, Smith (2014) finds that bigger
firms and financial sector firms were more likely to receive a bailout.
5DeYoung et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence for this risk-taking channel.
6See US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2011).
7See Keen (2011a) and Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2014b, pages 39-48) for an overview and for
the facts stated below.
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supervision and resolution mechanism in the European Union, which is to be fully op-
erational in 2016. In addition to European legislation, Germany passed a law for the
implementation of a separate banking system by 2016 and set rules for high-frequency
trading that include mandatory supervision by the BaFin, the German Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority.
As a further package of measures, governments also discussed the implementation of taxes.
Long-lasting negotiations have concluded in the introduction of a financial transactions
tax - a Tobin tax - in Germany and ten other member states of the EU that is due in 2016.8
This tax shall ensure that banks make a substantial contribution to the costs of rebuilding
and strengthening the financial sector. Further, the transactions tax aims at creating
disincentives for short-term speculation and enhancing sustainable investment strategies
(European Commission, 2013). When banks have to pay the financial transaction tax,
they are expected to rethink the benefit of large numbers of short-term transactions. All
these initiatives, reforms and taxes, show that governments initiated a broad range of
provisions in order to rethink and redesign financial markets in the medium- and long-
term.
In contrast to the reforms mentioned above that are expected to directly influence certain
bank processes, early initiatives focused especially on those deciding upon investments
- the bankers. The reason for first intervening at this issue was mainly a political one:
to calm down the public debate about compensation practices. When the financial crisis
began, compensation practices in financial markets focused on short-term profits rather
than long-term success (UK Financial Services Authority, 2008). In addition, due to
the fact that bonus payments are paid with a time lag, bankers received huge bonus
payments at times their banks had to be rescued by public money. In 2008, the year
the financial crises peaked, nine banks, including Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and
Citigroup, paid out bonuses of USD 32.6 billion. At the same time, the very same banks
reported combined losses of nearly USD 100 billion and had received USD 175 billion from
the TARP by the US government.9 The corresponding press reports promoted a public
debate about the magnitude of bonus payments to bankers, about the incentives the
bankers’ compensation packages entail and about the excesses of Wall Street. Initiatives
to regulate compensation practices and to tax bonus payments followed quickly.
On the regulatory side, the initiatives included the introduction of “principles for sound
8See Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2014a, page 38).
9See “Bank Bonus Tab: $33 Billion” (The Wall Street Journal 2009, July 31).
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compensation practices” (Financial Stability Forum, 2009) which was intended to estab-
lish incentive systems that prevent excessive risk taking in the future. On the tax side,
reforms of the fiscal treatment of managerial compensation first and foremost aimed at
decreasing the net-value of bonus payments. In doing so, governments hoped to achieve
several goals at the same time. On the one hand, they wanted to raise additional tax rev-
enue with the bonus tax while simultaneously decreasing “shameful” bonus payments.10
On the other hand, they hoped that bonus taxes might act as a corrective tax - a Pigou-
vian tax - that can be used in order to internalize possible externalities (Keen, 2011a).
Thus, several countries discussed surtaxes on managerial bonuses, and some countries
like the United Kingdom, France or Italy introduced such taxes for the financial sector
on a temporary or permanent basis (IMF, 2010). These real world examples show how
policy-relevant bonus taxes have been in the aftermath of the financial crisis. However,
governments pursued the introduction of bonus taxes while only having little knowledge
about their effects and benefits.
By analyzing the various effects of bonus taxation in three different environments, the
chapters of this dissertation make a contribution to the literature that aims to fill this
gap in our knowledge. As a look at bonus payments in different industries reveals, bonus
payments in the financial sector are much higher than bonus payments in the non-financial
sector (Von Ehrlich and Radulescu, 2012). With this in mind, two inevitable questions
arise: (i) Why does the financial sector pay higher bonuses than the non-financial sector
and (ii) can a bonus tax improve welfare? In general, a company has the right and the
possibility to pay its executives any level of compensation and to compose the payments
anyway it wants. However, the level of overall compensation will crucially depend on the
degree of competition in the market for executives, while the reason for paying bonuses
lies in the presence of information asymmetry. In the presence of imperfect information,
the firm has to pay some kind of incentive wage in order to deter the executive from
moral hazard.11
In order to focus on the relationship between the bank and its manager, Chapter 1 shows
the effects of bonus taxation on compensation and welfare in a framework without any
additional externality. The finding is that bonus taxation distorts bonus payments and
thereby incentives for the executive in a way such that no one benefits: neither a welfare
10See, for example “Darling Targets Bonuses, Says Rich will Pay More Tax” (bloomberg.com, 2009, Sep
28) or “Obama attacks Wall Street’s executive bonuses as ’shameful”’ (Financial Times, 2009, Jan
30).
11There exists a broad literature on efficient contracting, starting with the seminal paper by Jensen and
Meckling (1976). An overview can be found in Laffont and Martimort (2001).
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maximizing government, nor the firm nor the executive. This is not only true for a bonus
tax like the UK bank payroll tax, but also for different kinds of bonus taxation, e.g. a
limited deductibility provision. However, while this result holds for the situation analyzed
in Chapter 1, it does not hold in general. The analyses in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 show
the possible positive implications of bonus taxation on welfare. The main difference
compared to Chapter 1 is the presence of externalities that banks face, like the too-
many-to-fail or too-big-to-fail problem. Both externalities produce bonus ratios that are
higher than in the absence of these externalities, providing a theoretical rationale for the
observation of higher bonuses in the financial industry. In addition, both Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3 make a case for the Pigouvian element of a bonus tax and show that a bonus
tax can be used in order for a bank to (partly) internalize the externality of a bailout. By
that, a bonus tax can prevent excessive risk-taking and short-termism on the one hand
and increase welfare on the other hand.
In the following, the main results from each chapter of this thesis are presented. The
results in all three chapters were derived by using theoretical models within the basic
structure of the principal-agent theory. The number of players or the time structure in
each model has been extended and adjusted to analyze the respective research question.
As each chapter is based on a stand-alone paper, each chapter can be read separately.
The thesis starts with a comparison of different fiscal instruments that can affect manage-
rial compensation and were discussed or even implemented by some governments. We use
a unified principal-agent model to analyze and compare the consequences of three differ-
ent instruments: (i) bonus taxes managers (agents) need to pay, (ii) limited deductibility
of bonuses from company profits and (iii) a corporate income tax (CIT) payable by the
bank (principal). In the model, a manager with limited liability exerts unobservable
effort that positively affects expected profit. As a compensation, the manager can be
paid a fixed wage and an outcome-contingent bonus as incentive device. Based on this
framework, we explore how the three tax instruments mentioned above affect managerial
incentives and how they change the design of incentive contracts used in equilibrium.
For a given compensation structure, we find that a bonus tax decreases net bonuses and
reduces effort. In contrast, limited deductibility neither has an effect on the manager’s
bonus payment nor on effort. However, for incentive contracts used in equilibrium, both
a bonus tax and limited deductibility of bonus payments from company profits reduce
the manager’s effort. On the one hand, this reduced equilibrium effort allows the bank
to lower the manager’s net bonus - both for a bonus tax and limited deductibility. On
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the other hand, as the bonus tax is payable by the manager, his gross bonus payments
may even increase when a bonus tax is introduced in order to compensate him for his
additional costs. Nevertheless, limited deductibility and bonus taxes are close substitutes
in terms of welfare. Both lead to a welfare loss compared to a CIT raising the same tax
revenue. This is due to the fact that the CIT has no effect on the incentive contract.
Beyond that, the CIT can even be used to reduce the welfare loss associated with the
information asymmetry between manager and bank. To achieve this loss reduction, the
government has to increase the CIT and use this increase to finance a subsidy for bonus
payments. This chapter builds on Hilmer (2013).
The second chapter analyzes for the effects of a bonus tax in the presence of an externality.
It simplifies the analysis of Chapter 1 by focusing on a bonus tax, but extends the previous
model by covering the systemic nature of highly interconnected financial institutions. In
contrast to the too-big-to-fail literature, we assume financial institutions to be systemic
only on a collective basis, generating the too-many-to-fail externality. This assumption
has several features which distinguish the analysis from the too-big-to-fail approach.
Most importantly, it implies that banks receive a bailout only if several banks fail jointly.
Thereby, the model in Chapter 2 does not only cover large banks, but also incorporates
small banks. Moreover, as a bailout crucially depends on the decision of another bank,
this too-many-to-fail assumption generates incentives for herding and collective moral
hazard, which are absent within the too-big-to-fail literature. We use a simple symmetric
principal-agent model with two banks in order to analyze the incentives in the presence
of this too-many-to-fail externality in a straightforward framework. In case a wealth-
constrained manager is the only one knowing about the distribution of returns to an
available project, the bank has to use incentive payments such as a bonus in order to
align interests. In combination with the bailout externality, this agency problem allows
us to analyze the effects of both bailouts and bonus taxes on risk-taking, collective moral
hazard and managerial compensation. We find that if banks can anticipate bailouts,
they can coordinate on an equilibrium in which they collectively incentivize excessive,
inefficient risk-taking. A bonus tax can prevent this excessive risk-taking. It reduces the
risk-taking of the taxed bank and, consequently, rules out the equilibrium with excessive
risk-taking by both banks and reestablishes market discipline. This is also true if the
bonus tax is implemented unilaterally for one bank only. Chapter 2 is based on Hilmer
(2014b).
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, we provide another principal-agent model, which extends
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the number of periods analyzed. In doing so, we can examine in which respect i) the
externality of a bailout and ii) the introduction of a bonus tax on short-term payments
influence the timing of investment strategies and how they affect the relationship between
long-term and short-term compensation. For this purpose, we model investments that
last for two periods. The manager can (costly) choose the degree of short-termism. While
short-termism increases expected short-term profits, it comes at the expense of expected
long-term profits. As short-termism is assumed to be harmful not only for society, but
also for the bank itself, it should be in the bank’s best interest to prevent any short-termist
action by the manager. However, this does not happen in the presence of a bailout. As
it allows the bank to neglect the costs of failure, an anticipated bailout induces the bank
to tolerate short-termist behavior more often and to a higher degree. The reason for this
can be found in the manager’s compensation structure. While it is indeed in the bank’s
interest to prevent short-termism by using an appropriate compensation structure in the
absence of a bailout, it is not anymore in the presence of a bailout. In the presence of a
bailout, it is more profitable for the bank to change its compensation structure towards
higher short-term payments while tolerating the negative consequence of increased short-
termism. However, an appropriate tax on short-term bonuses can induce the bank to
internalize the costs of a bailout. With such a tax, the determinants of incentive provision
can be changed and the compensation structure of managers can be shifted towards long-
term bonuses. Finally, inefficient short-termism can be prevented. Chapter 3 is based on
Hilmer (2014a).
To sum up, the models in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 offer a rationale for a bonus tax
when banks anticipate bailouts and adjust their compensation payments accordingly.
Whenever there exists some probability that the government covers a part of the losses,
banks want to adjust their investment strategies in order to exploit this (partial) risk
coverage by the government. As banks depend on their managers taking action in their
interest, they adjust their managers’ compensation structure and their incentives. In
such an environment, a bonus tax is beneficial as it can increase the costs of incentive
provision and internalize (part of) the externality. However, this positive effect of a bonus
tax only occurs in the presence of an externality. And the effects of a bonus tax differ
in the type of externality. While a bonus tax (up to a certain point) is always beneficial
in the presence of the too-big-to-fail externality, it must not be for the case of collective
moral hazard in the presence of the too-many-to-fail externality. Without an externality
as shown in Chapter 1, a bonus tax intensifies the principal-agent problem and reduces
welfare.
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Hence, whenever a government considers the implementation of a bonus tax, it has to
take the specific purpose of the tax into account. Bonus taxation can be helpful in
internalizing externalities. However, as bonus taxation may distort incentive provision,
it is not the optimal instrument to use when a government wants to raise tax revenue. In
such a case it could happen that bonus taxation hurts banks, bank managers, and society
as a whole.
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Chapter 1.
Fiscal Treatment of Managerial
Compensation - a Welfare Analysis
1.1. Introduction
In the context of the recent financial and fiscal crisis, a public debate about high pay-
ments for bankers and other managers, their compensation packages and possible reg-
ulating mechanisms came up. Several politicians called out “greed and recklessness” in
the financial system12 and considered bankers’ pay to be disproportionately high.13 In
response, some countries reformed and many others discussed the tax treatment of man-
agerial compensation. Nevertheless, there is not much known about the various effects
thereof.
This chapter compares three taxation instruments in a unified principal-agent framework
and fills this gap. We use a tax system with tax instruments that were discussed - and
partly even implemented. These are bonus taxes, limited deductibility of bonus payments
and a corporate income tax (CIT). Comparing them, we analyze their effects on man-
agerial incentives, the design of incentive contracts used in equilibrium and their welfare
implications. This will be done using a principal-agent model in which the agent with
limited liability can receive a fixed wage and a bonus and in which both the principal’s
profit and the agent’s income are potentially subject to the following taxes. First, we
12“Darling Targets Bonuses, Says Rich will Pay More Tax” (bloomberg.com, 2009, Sep 28).
13See “E.U. Could Trim Bank Bonuses” (advisorone.com, 2012, Apr 25): “[. . . ] According to Michel
Barnier, the financial services commissioner of the E.U., some banker pay is beyond ‘all reason,
common sense and morality.‘ [. . . ]“ or “Obama attacks Wall Street’s executive bonuses as ’shameful‘”
(Financial Times, 2009, Jan 30).
9
Fiscal Treatment of Managerial Compensation - a Welfare Analysis
consider a CIT payable by the principal and based on net profit. Second, we introduce
a bonus tax which is a surtax on managerial bonuses payable by the agent. This tax
is comparable to the 50% bank payroll tax introduced in the UK in 2009 and levied
on bankers’ bonus payments exceeding GBP 25.000 for the fiscal year 2009-2010 (UK
Finance Act 2010, Schedule 1).14 Other examples are Ireland, that introduced a 90%
bankers’ bonus tax in January 2011 for banks supported by the government, and the US,
where the House of Representatives approved such a 90% tax already in March 2009.15
The third tax instrument modeled is a set of rules concerning the deductibility of bonus
payments as operating expenses against the corporate income tax.16 Limited deductibil-
ity of bonuses from the corporate tax base broadens the corporate tax base and leads to
a higher corporate tax burden, ceteris paribus. In the US, annual salaries exceeding USD
1 Mio are not deductible.17 In other countries like Germany and Switzerland, limited
deductibility was part of the public debate. In Germany, the parties “Die Linke” and
“Bündnis 90, Die Grünen” started such a request, while in Switzerland, the Swiss Federal
Council and the Council of States tried to incorporate a limited deductibility of salaries
exceeding CHF 3 Mio in a referendum but were blocked by the National Council.18
Our results suggest the following: For a given compensation structure, a bonus tax di-
rectly lowers the agent’s net bonus and leads to a reduced effort choice once it is intro-
duced. In contrast, neither limited deductibility nor a CIT affect existing managerial
incentives. In equilibrium, where the principal anticipates the agent’s optimal effort
choice, any taxation of bonuses will lead to reduced effort and net bonus. In the case
of limited deductibility, the principal accounts for his own higher tax burden and thus
incentivizes a lower effort level by reducing the agent’s bonus. A bonus tax, however,
can also lead to an increased gross bonus payment by the principal. Nevertheless, both
mentioned ways of bonus taxation are close substitutes and lower welfare. Compared to
a situation where only a CIT is used to raise tax revenue, both reduce the principal’s
and the agent’s rent. With full deductibility of bonuses thereof, a CIT is superior as
14In UK, the bank payroll tax had to be paid by the banks. Even though, as our interest in the tax
incidence and the effects on compensation structure does not depend on the taxpayer, we model the
bonus tax in line with literature (e.g. Dietl et al., 2013) that it be payable by the manager.
15See “Ireland to reintroduce 90% bank bonus tax” (guardian.co.uk, 2011, Jan 26) and “Bonus Tax
Heads to Senate After House Passes 90% Levy” (bloomberg.com, 2009, Mar 20).
16A change in deductibility is a prevalent policy instrument also for other areas of governmental inter-
vention. See, for instance, Koethenbuerger and Stimmelmayr (2014) for deductibility of investments.
17According to § 162 (m)(1) IRC, for the CEO and the next four highest-paid officers of a firm, no
deduction for remuneration that exceeds USD 1 Mio for the tax year is allowed. There exists a
complex exception for compensation paid under a “performance-based plan”.
18See “Switzerland: Proposals affecting executive compensation” (pwc.ch, 2012, Oct).
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it affects neither managerial incentives nor the design of the incentive contracts used in
equilibrium.19 Without regard to its political implications, we find that governmental
intervention can increase welfare towards the first-best solution. This can be achieved by
using a corrective tax system: subsidizing bonus payments while financing those expenses
by way of an increased CIT.
1.2. Related Literature
Methodically, we rely on the literature of efficient contracting and the agency theory
that studies the relationship between a firm owner and a manager who is incentivized to
operate the company.20 Competitive market forces foster optimal contracting and allow
an analysis of the problem of imperfect information and moral hazard.21 Specifically we
build our analysis on the assumption of limited liability as first introduced by Sappington
(1983), but rather analyze a situation in which the agent makes an ex-ante effort choice
(Innes 1990, Park 1995 and Kim 1997, among others). In addition, we follow Laffont and
Martimort (2001, p. 194) and assume two possible outcomes with a continuum of effort
levels. In order to compare tax instruments, we expand their specification in this respect
and adjust the structure of compensation payments to our purposes.
Apart from the literature on agency theory, this chapter is related to studies on the
taxation of the financial sector and on the taxation of risky returns.22 Regarding bonus
taxation, this literature can be split in two basic lines of theoretical research: with and
without externalities.23 With the externality of bailouts, a bonus tax affects the trade-
19Among others, Buchholz and Konrad (2000) support this neutrality result for a non-redistributive tax
on profits in the presence of moral hazard.
20Another view on executive compensation is given by Bebchuk et al. (2002), Bebchuk and Fried (2003)
and Bebchuk and Fried (2004) who believe in compensation agreements as an outcome of powerful,
rent-seeking managers. For the taxation of rent-seeking activities, see Glazer and Konrad (1999) and
Rothschild and Scheuer (2011), among others. Frydman and Jenter (2010) and Murphy (2013) provide
an overview on the contributions in both lines of literature and analyze strengths and weaknesses of
both.
21Early contributions in this area were made by Ross (1973), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Harris and
Raviv (1979), Holmstrom (1979), Shavell (1979), and Grossman and Hart (1983) among others.
22See, for instance, Shackelford et al. (2010), Keen (2011a) and Devereux (2011) for a broader analysis
of other discussed new tax measures on the financial sector (e.g. the Financial Transactions Tax or
the Financial Activities Tax), and Konrad (1991) and Buchholz and Konrad (2014) for the effects of
taxation on risk-taking activities.
23For the empirical impacts of various tax rates (personal, corporate and capital gains tax rates) on
executive compensation, Hall and Liebman (2000) find little evidence for tax policy influencing re-
muneration. However, for personal income taxes, Katuscák (2009) estimates that higher tax rates
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off between efficiency and rent extraction, but is optimal when there is moral hazard
with respect to both effort and risk taking (Besley and Ghatak, 2013). According to
Keen (2011b), corrective taxation in the presence of bailouts requires a charge on the
bank’s borrowing which can be supported by minimum capital requirements. Thanas-
soulis (2012) emphasizes the negative externality of competition. He finds that competing
for the best teams of bankers drives up market wages and so rival banks’ expected costs
of bankruptcy. Nevertheless, he does not observe any effect of bonus taxation other than
redistributing money to the government.
For bonus taxation in the absence of systemic externalities, Radulescu (2012) examines
the effects of a bonus tax in a two-country framework with endogenous or exogenous
reservation wages. She finds that the introduction of a bonus tax in one country results in
a decline in the agent’s effort and that the incidence mainly falls on the firm’s shareholders.
In the case of endogenous reservation wage, results are largely similar and depend on the
strength of the negative reaction of the reservation wage to the bonus tax. However, alike
Dietl et al. (2013) and Grossmann et al. (2012), Radulescu (2012) focuses in her analysis
solely on the effects of a bonus tax. Therefore, we extend existing research in analyzing
different tax instruments in a unified framework. The work by Dietl et al. (2013) is
closest to the present model. They analyze the effects of a bonus tax on the composition
of executives’ compensation and their incentives to exert effort in a principal-agent model
with a risk-averse agent. As in this chapter, they identify that a bonus tax increases the
costs of incentive payments which in turn results in decreased managerial effort. However,
for the composition of managerial compensation, their effects depend on the uncertainty
of the economic environment and the agent’s risk aversion. Although abstaining from
uncertainty and risk aversion, our model still identifies circumstances in which bonus
payments are increasing and other situations in which they are decreasing. Grossmann
et al. (2012) extend the model by Dietl et al. (2013) to an agent who can influence
expected outcome next to effort also via his risk-taking behavior. In this constellation,
they observe a substitution effect between effort and risk-taking where the agent increases
risk-taking and simultaneously decreases effort as a response to a bonus tax.24
decrease the pay-to-performance sensitivity for option grants, while no such effect can be found with
respect to restricted stock grants. For bonus taxes, Von Ehrlich and Radulescu (2012) show that
bonus payments decreased by 40% in the course of the UK bank payroll tax. However, their findings
also suggest an one-to-one increase in other pay components not subject to the tax.
24As compensation structure shifts towards a fixed salary, the bonus tax in Grossmann et al. (2012)
decreases the agent’s marginal revenue of risk taking. However, as the risk averse agent faces less
income uncertainty, his marginal costs of risk decrease even more. This results in risk taking that
increases in the bonus tax.
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This chapter contributes to the literature as it - next to an analysis of the effects of a
bonus tax - additionally examines the effects of different tax instruments such as a CIT
and limited deductibility of bonus payments from the CIT in a simple model. Therefore,
we provide a unified framework that makes the mentioned tax instruments and their
effects on effort choice and welfare comparable.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 1.3, we introduce the model and derive the
optimal compensation structure chosen by the principal. An analysis of the different tax
instruments and their effects on the effort level and the bonus payments follows. Section
1.4 discusses the welfare effects of the different tax instruments. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.3. Incentive Contracts in a Principal-Agent-Setup
1.3.1. Model and Equilibrium
Principal-Agent Setup The model specification is as follows: There is one risk-neutral
shareholder (principal) who delegates the task of operating the company to a risk-neutral
manager (agent), who has limited liability and zero initial wealth.25 This is done by
offering a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the manager, who has an exogenous outside option
u = 0.26 If the manager accepts the contract, he starts operating the firm by choosing
an unobservable effort level from a continuum e ∈ [0, 1]. For the manager, the effort he
exerts comes at an effort cost C(e). In line with the literature, we make two assumptions
on the effort cost function: First, it is considered as strictly convex (C ′(e) > 0, C ′′(e) >
0, C ′′′(e) > 0) with C(0) = 0.27 Second, to ensure interior solutions, the Inada conditions
C ′(0) = 0 and lime→1C ′(e) = ∞ are imposed on the cost function. Firm’s profit is
random and depends on the state of the world s ∈ {1, 2}. It can take two values: high
25We decided on a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent as we are interested in the effects of
different tax instruments rather than in risk sharing issues.
26For simplicity, we assume the manager’s outside option u being exogenous and equal to zero. While
taxation may cause feedback effects on the outside option, those effects should be treated equal for
different kinds of bonus taxation. For this reason feedback effects would cancel out in a comparison of
taxation instruments. Our results are also generally applicable to u > 0. However, to analyze the case
with information asymmetry between principal and agent and to implement moral hazard we would
have to assume eC ′(e) − C(e) ≥ u, which is always satisfied if u = 0. We discuss the implications
of this assumption following up on Proposition 1.1. For the effects of endogenous outside option, it
may be referred to Radulescu (2012).
27Note that C ′′′(e) > 0 ensures strict concavity of the principal’s maximization problem. Though, in
order to satisfy the second-order condition for a maximum, C ′′′
(
eSB
)
> − 2C
′′(eSB)
eSB
is sufficient.
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(and equal to π1) or low (and equal to π2) with π1 > π2 ≥ 0. Effort e determines the
probability by which profit is high. By appropriate normalization, this probability is
equal to e. Once the profit πs is determined, the agent is paid. As compensation for the
task of operating the company, the manager is offered a linear payment scheme consisting
of two components. First, the agent is paid a fixed wage A ∈ R+0 independently of the
state of the world. Secondly, the principal can remit an additional bonus when the task
was successful, i.e. if πs = π1.28 This bonus is specified such that a bonus rate b ≥ 0 is
applied on the difference between the profit levels in the good and the bad state of the
world. This gives, in total, a bonus b(π1 − π2) to be added to the fixed wage A.
Government Before the take-it-or-leave-it contract is offered to the agent, the govern-
ment can implement up to three different tax instruments. First, the principal’s op-
erating profits net of compensation payments can be taxed by a corporate income tax
(CIT), t ∈ [0, 1). Second, deductibility of bonus payments from the CIT base can be
restricted, thereby broadening the CIT base and increasing taxes. Tax deductibility of
bonus payments is captured by parameter α ∈ [0, 1], where α = 1 covers full deductibility
of the bonus payment from the CIT base. For α 6= 1, fixed compensation A and bonus
payments b(π1 − π2) are treated differently when it comes to corporate income taxation.
While the fixed wage always is fully deductible from the CIT base, bonus payments are
not, e.g. if α = 0, bonuses are not tax deductible at all from the CIT base. Thus, with
bonus payments, the firm’s tax base, and, accordingly, its tax burden, is higher the lower
α is.29 Third, bonuses can be subject to a bonus tax, tb ∈ [0, 1), which has to be paid by
the agent.
Maximization The principal keeps the residual of the profit after compensation pay-
ments to the agent and CIT t with bonus deductibility α. Accordingly, the expected
payoff E (UP ) for the principal is
E (UP ) = e (1− t) (π1 − A)− e (1− αt) b(π1 − π2) + [1− e](1− t)(π2 − A). (1.1)
28Because the principal can observe profit but not the agent’s effort, an enforceable contract can only
be specified on realized profit πS .
29Because of these two tax instruments, the principal’s expected payoff E (UP ) is defined as the difference
between operating profit πs and compensation payments, taking into account the applied tax rates
and deductibility.
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The agent’s total net-compensation after bonus taxes tb, x1 in the good state of the world
and x2 in the bad state of the world, are denoted by:
x1 = A+ (1− tb)b(π1 − π2),
x2 = A.
(1.2)
When the principal offers a contract to the agent, the agent maximizes his expected net
income E(x)− C(e) by choosing effort e. Depending on the proposed fixed wage, bonus
payments, his effort costs and taxes, the agent’s maximization problem is given by
max
e∈[0,1]
{A+ e(1− tb)b(π1 − π2)− C (e)} ,
from which we get the following first order condition (FOC):
(1− tb) b (π1 − π2) = C ′ (e) (1.3)
The agent’s effort choice will be such that the marginal (net of tax) benefit of an increase
in effort equals the marginal effort costs. Moreover, (1.3) shows the effects of bonus
taxation on existing managerial incentives. While the introduction of a bonus tax ceteris
paribus decreases the agent’s net bonus and leads to reduced effort by the agent, limited
deductiblity has no effects on existing managerial incentives as it has to be borne by the
principal via the CIT.
Taking (1.3) as given, the principal in the first stage chooses compensation consisting of
fixed wage A and bonus parameter b which maximizes his expected payoff E (UP ):
max
(A,b)≥0
{e (1− t) (π1 − A)− e (1− αt) b(π1 − π2) + [1− e](1− t)(π2 − A)} (1.4)
s.t. A+ eSB(1− tb)bSB(π1 − π2)− C
(
eSB
)
≥ u (1.5)
(1− tb) bSB (π1 − π2) = C ′
(
eSB
)
(1.6)
x1, x2 ≥ 0 (1.7)
Equation (1.5) shows the agent’s participation constraint (PC), which the principal has
to consider. It states that the agent will only accept the principal’s take-it-or-leave-it
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offer if his expected net-compensation (after income-/ bonus tax) at least remunerates
him for the effort level eSB that the principal chooses to induce and his exogenous outside
option u which he forgoes. Moreover, with (1.6) the principal accounts for the agent’s
first order condition (1.3) that ensures that the agent has a higher expected income when
choosing the principal’s desired effort level than he would have with any other effort
level. In addition, we impose the limited liability constraint (1.7) on the agent’s net
compensation, by which the compensation in any state of the world cannot be negative
due to the wealth restrictions the agent is faced with.30 As the bonus payment is positive
by definition, the fixed wage has to be non-negative.31 This makes (1.7) binding for x2,
while it remains slack for x1.
Proposition 1.1. There exists a unique equilibrium (ASB, bSB, eSB) where the principal
offers a fixed compensation ASB = 0 and a bonus rate bSB that satisfies
bSB = 1− t1− αt −
eSBC ′′
(
eSB
)
(1− tb) (π1 − π2)
. (1.8)
The agent’s effort choice eSB is implicitly given by his first order condition (1.3).
Proof. A binding limited wealth constraint (1.7) with respect to x2 directly implies ASB =
0. As eC ′(e)−C(e) ≥ 0, the incentive constraint must be binding such that agent’s effort
is implicitly defined by (1.3). Using this fact, (1.8) states the solution to the principal’s
maximization with respect to the optimal bonus bSB. By substituting (1.3) in (1.8) and
taking the derivative with respect to eSB, one can show that the second-order condition
for a maximum is satisfied whenever C ′′′
(
eSB
)
> −2C
′′(eSB)
eSB
. By assumptions C ′′(e) > 0
and C ′′′(e) > 0, this is always the case.
The fact that the fixed wage ASB = 0 comes from the assumption on the agent’s exogenous
outside option.32 In order to incentivize the agent to exert the desired effort level eSB,
the principal has to pay a bonus bSB. By assuming u = 0, this bonus is in expectation
30Constraint (1.7) ensures that the principal can not apply the general solution of making the agent the
residual claimant of the firm to overcome the moral hazard problem when both the agent and the
principal are risk neutral (Harris and Raviv 1979, Shavell 1979).
31This prevents the principal from extracting rents from the agent by paying a negative fixed wage.
32The outcome of ASB = 0 relies on the agent’s limited liability and the assumptions on the exogenous
outside option u = 0. While limited liability ensures A ≥ 0, the latter constraint makes the Limited
Liability Constraint (1.7) for the bad state of the world binding, i.e. x2 = ASB = 0. As shown by
Pitchford (1998), lump sum transfers like A have no incentive effects as opposed to an increase in the
gap between state-contingent payments.
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already higher than would be necessary in order to satisfy the participation constraint
(1.5). Thus, the principal would like to pay a negative fixed wage, as this would lead to
a binding PC and a higher rent for him. However, the limited liability constraint (1.7)
prevents the principal from paying negative compensation. Combined with the agent’s
informational advantage, this results in an expected rent E (UA) for the agent:
E (UA) = [E(x)− C(e)] = eC ′ (e)− C (e) > 0 (1.9)
By substitution, the principal’s optimal bonus payment (1.8) and the agent’s first order
condition with respect to effort (1.3) yield
(1− t) (π1 − π2) =
1− αt
(1− tb)
[
C ′
(
eSB
)
+ eSBC ′′
(
eSB
)]
, (1.10)
which defines the second-best effort level eSB that is induced by the principal.33 This
second-best effort level under moral hazard is lower than in the first-best case, where
effort eFB is observable and contractible. In the first-best scenario, characterized by
(1− t) (π1 − π2) = 1−αt(1−tb)C
′
(
eFB
)
, the marginal expected profit gain (on the left hand side
of the equation) from increasing the effort level by a small amount equals the marginal
expected employment costs. In the second-best scenario, there is an additional term
1−αt
(1−tb)
eSBC ′′
(
eSB
)
.34 This additional expression states the tax adjusted marginal costs of
the agent’s limited liability rent under moral hazard and induces the principal to reduce
the implemented effort level to one below the first-best level. This in turn reduces his
expected employment costs.35
33Equation (1.10) allows us to prove existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium denoted in Proposition
1.1. By the imposed Inada condition on the cost function, the right hand side is zero for e = 0, whereas
the left hand side is positive by assumption. As the right hand side is monotonically increasing in e
(by C ′′′
(
eSB
)
> − 2C
′′(eSB)
eSB
) and with the Inada condition lime→1 C ′(e) = ∞, there is exactly one
intersection for the unique equilibrium e = eSB .
34For comparison, the equation for first-best effort shows a situation where only a bonus is paid to
the agent. However, as the principal in the first-best case can observe agent’s effort, a fixed wage
AF B = C(eF B) + u and a bonus bF B = 0 or a combination making the participation constraint
binding is also possible. This payment will be made whenever the agent exerts the desired effort eF B
- no matter whether the task was successful or not.
35As we are interested in the differential taxation of compensation components, we abstract from a
taxation of the fixed wage. Including a personal income tax, ti ∈ [0, 1), based on all of the agent’s
income components would mean that bonuses would be burdened twice with taxes if both ti > 0 and
tb > 0. Note that for the equilibrium fixed wage ASB = 0, a personal income tax and a bonus tax
would have the same tax base and therefore would be substitutes.
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1.3.2. Comparative Statics
Proposition 1.1 shows that the equilibrium bonus rate paid to the agent (and so equilib-
rium effort) depends on the different taxation instruments included in the model. In the
following, we analyze their effects on equilibrium effort and the respective bonus payment
required.
Starting with a bonus tax, we can see from the optimality conditions (1.8) and (1.3) that
both the optimal bonus and the optimal effort depend on tb, whereas the fixed wage is
not affected by a bonus tax. Moreover, it can be shown that the agent’s effort choice
negatively reacts to a bonus tax and that the bonus rate b does not necessarily decrease
in the bonus tax tb.
Corollary 1.1. (i) Equilibrium effort eSB is strictly decreasing in the bonus tax tb.
(ii) The equilibrium bonus rate bSB is strictly increasing in the bonus tax tb if and only if
bSB
1− tb
>
(1− t)
(1− αt) (1− tb)
C ′′
(
eSB
)
[2C ′′(eSB) + eSBC ′′′(eSB)] . (1.11)
Proof. Part (i): The implicit function theorem on (1.10) yields
∂eSB
∂tb
= −
1−t
1−αt (π1−π2)
[2C′′(eSB)+eSBC′′′(eSB)] < 0.
Part (ii): Taking ∂b
SB(eSB)
∂tb
from (1.3), using part (i) of this proof and substituting (1.3)
into the derivative yields ∂b
SB(eSB)
∂tb
= bSB1−tb −
(1−t)
(1−αt)(1−tb)
C′′(eSB)
[2C′′(eSB)+eSBC′′′(eSB)] .
Ad (i): According to the agent’s FOC (1.3), a (higher) bonus tax reduces the agent’s
marginal net of tax benefit while leaving marginal costs unchanged. This leads to reduced
equilibrium effort as long as the agent does not get perfectly compensated by an increased
bonus rate for the additional tax burden. This again is not profitable for the principal.
While the principal’s marginal expected profit gain from effort remains unchanged, the
marginal expected employment costs of effort increase with the bonus tax. Therefore,
equilibrium effort strictly decreases in the bonus tax.
Part (ii) of Corollary 1.1 shows that the total effect of a bonus tax on the bonus rate is
ambiguous with two effects driving the bonus rate: an indirect effort effect and a direct
tax effect. As equilibrium effort decreases in the bonus tax, the agent also accepts a
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lower net-of-tax bonus as his marginal cost of exerting effort decreases. However, as the
agent is only interested in his net-wage, the principal has to compensate him for the
additional tax burden. This effect, ceteris paribus, increases the (gross) bonus rate which
the principal has to pay to the agent. For any effort level eSB for which condition (1.11)
is satisfied, the latter positive tax effect exceeds the negative effort effect.
For the CIT and limited tax deductibility of bonus payments, the described tax-effect of
a bonus tax does not exist. Limited deductibility of bonuses from the CIT-base broadens
the tax base for the CIT and indirectly increases the principal’s tax burden. The agent, in
contrast, is not subject to this tax. As the agent’s net and gross bonus rates do not differ
for these instruments, effects on effort and bonus will always go in the same direction in
equilibrium. Still, there is an effect on effort and the bonus payment via the principal’s
optimization.
Corollary 1.2. (i) If bonuses are fully deductible (α = 1), eSB and bSB are not affected
by the CIT t.
(ii) If there is limited deductibility of bonuses from the CIT (α < 1), then eSB and bSB
are strictly decreasing in t. The less deductible bonus payments are, the stronger is the
marginal effect of the CIT t on eSB and bSB.
(iii) If there is a CIT (t < 1), then eSB and bSB are strictly increasing in the deductibility
α. The higher the CIT is, the larger is the marginal effect of deductibility α on eSB and
bSB.
Proof. Applying the implicit function theorem on (1.10) and substituting
(1.10) into the resulting derivative yield ∂eSB
∂t
= − (1−α)δ(1−αt)(1−t) and
∂eSB
∂α
= tδ(1−t) , with
δ = [C
′(eSB)+eSBC′′(eSB)]
[2C′′(eSB)+eSBC′′′(eSB)] > 0.
∂eSB
∂t
|α=1 = 0, ∂e
SB
∂t
|α<1 < 0 and ∂e
SB
∂a
|t<1 > 0 follow imme-
diately. Taking ∂b
SB(eSB)
∂t
and ∂b
SB(eSB)
∂α
from (1.3) yield ∂b
SB(eSB)
∂t
= C
′′(eSB)
(1−tb)(π1−π2)
∂eSB
∂t
and
∂bSB(eSB)
∂α
= C
′′(eSB)
(1−tb)(π1−π2)
∂eSB
∂α
. Thus, sign
(
∂bSB(eSB)
∂t
)
= sign
(
∂eSB
∂t
)
and sign
(
∂bSB(eSB)
∂α
)
=
sign
(
∂eSB
∂α
)
. For the strength of marginal effects, ∂|
∂eSB
∂t
|
∂α
= − δ(1−αt)2 < 0 and
∂ ∂e
SB
∂α
∂t
=
δ
(1−t)2 > 0.
Part (i) of the Corollary follows from (1.10). With full deductibility of bonus payments
from the CIT, a (higher) CIT changes the marginal expected profit gain of effort to
the same extent as do the marginal expected employment costs. Therefore there is no
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change of the bonus rate and, as a result, no adjustment in the desired effort level.36
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Corollary 1.2 show the distortion due to the limited deductibility
of bonus payments from the CIT-base. According to (1.10), there is still no change in
the principal’s marginal expected profit gain due to the combination of CIT and limited
deductibility compared to a situation with full deductibility of bonuses. However, limited
deductibility increases the marginal expected employment costs via broadening the CIT-
base in case the agent was successful. Therefore, equilibrium effort decreases and a lower
bonus is paid in equilibrium. This effect is more pronounced either for the CIT the less
deductible bonus payments are, or for limited deductibility the higher the CIT already
is.
1.4. Welfare Comparison of the Tax Instruments
Having seen how the different taxation instruments distort equilibrium effort and bonuses,
we now want to assess whether or not one instrument is superior to the others with
regard to welfare implications. For this purpose, we define welfare as the sum of agent’s
expected payoff E (UA), principal’s expected payoff E (UP ) and expected tax revenue
E (T ), resulting in expected welfare E (W ) = eπ1 +(1− e) π2−C (e). By assumption, the
government sets its tax rates before the contract between principal and agent is specified
and therefore takes the equilibrium results from Proposition 1.1 as given. Furthermore,
we suppose that the government has to raise an exogenous tax revenue to fulfill its public
duties. We denote this revenue requirement by B.37
The total expected tax revenue consists of two parts: The expected bonus tax paid by
the agent, E (Tb) = eb(π1 − π2)tb, and the expected corporate income tax paid by the
principal, E (Tcit) = et (π1 − A− αb(π1 − π2)) + (1− e) t(π2 − A). Inserting the results
from Proposition 1.1, we get the following expression for total expected tax revenue E (T ):
36For the sake of completeness, we would like to add that without CIT (t = 0), limited deductibility
does not have any effects as a broadening of the (non-existing) tax base cannot have an impact.
37Note that there exists a bound on the maximal achievable revenue requirement Bmax that satisfies
E (UA) ≥ 0 and E (UP ) ≥ 0. Otherwise, no principal-agent contract would be signed. While the con-
dition E (UA) ≥ 0 holds by (1.9) for any tax rate, we need B ≤ Bmax ≡ π2+eSB
[
π1 − π2 − C ′
(
eSB
)]
in order that the principal weakly prefers offering a contract compared to not offering a contract.
In the presence of tax rates that lead to distortions (as in Subsections 1.4.2 and 1.4.3), the maxi-
mal achievable tax revenue B is lower than Bmax. To guarantee the presence of the principal-agent
problem, we assume B to be as small that the principal can finance the tax duties.
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E (T ) = t [π2 + e (π1 − π2)] + e
C ′ (e) (tb − αt)
(1− tb)
. (1.12)
As all parties involved in our model (principal, agent and government) are risk neutral,
all payments (wage, tax) have only distributional impacts and do not affect welfare.
Altogether, our welfare optimization problem can be written as
max
t,tb,α
{
eSBπ1 +
(
1− eSB
)
π2 − C
(
eSB
)}
(1.13)
s.t. E (T (t, tb, α)) ≥ B (1.14)
where the agent’s effort choice eSB is implicitly given by (1.10). Government chooses its
tax instruments in such a way that overall efficiency is highest while still being able to
raise in expectation the desired tax revenue B from (1.12).
Note that without the tax revenue constraint (1.14) and being able to directly choose the
effort level, the welfare maximizing government would opt for the following result:
π1 − π2 = C ′ (e∗) . (1.15)
Confronted with (1.14) and knowing that the second-best case, due to the agent’s limited
liability rent, is already characterized by an inefficiently low effort eSB < e∗, the gov-
ernment will choose a tax structure which least distorts the agent’s effort choice beyond
that.
1.4.1. Optimal Mixture of Tax Instruments
Let us first consider a situation in which the government can choose between the tax
instruments in a “normal” range - meaning t, tb ∈ [0, 1) and α ∈ [0, 1].38 In this setting,
the government will always choose to raise its necessary tax revenue solely with the
neutral CIT whereas the bonus tax and limited deductibility would reduce effort and,
consequently, welfare. According to Corollary 1.2, the CIT does not distort equilibrium
38This assumption on the ranges of α and tb will be abolished in Subsection 1.4.3.
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effort beyond the limited liability rent when there is full deductibility. Equation (1.10)
reduces to (π1 − π2) =
[
C ′
(
eSBt∗
)
+ eSBt∗ C ′′
(
eSBt∗
)]
and implies the highest possible effort
level in this case, where eSBt∗ denotes the incentivized effort given the optimal tax structure
with t∗. This structure is given by t∗ =
[
B
π2+eSBt∗ [π1−π2−C′(eSBt∗ )]
, 1
)
, α∗ = 1 and t∗b = 0.39
Moreover, it implies that bonus taxation should not be used for revenue purpose because
both a bonus tax and limited deductibility of bonuses from the CIT are inferior to a
CIT.40
1.4.2. Comparison of Bonus Tax and Limited Deductibility of
Bonuses
In order to compare the different bonus taxation regimes, suppose there are restrictions,
e.g. an exposure to tax competition, which limit the CIT to t̄ < t∗ and therewith prohibit
the government from raising it to the optimal level analyzed above. In this case, there
is some tax revenue which has to be raised from one of the remaining instruments. We
maximize welfare with an exogenously given bound for the CIT t̄ < t∗ by choosing tb and
α.
From corollaries 1.1 and 1.2, we know that both a bonus tax and limited deductibility
strictly decrease equilibrium effort eSB and welfare. Due to this distortion, a welfare
maximizing government will not raise tax revenue beyond its requirement B. This allows
us to use (1.14) in order to express each α and tb as a function of the other. Inserting
either α (tb, t) or tb (α, t) in (1.10) to derive equilibrium effort shows that any combina-
tion of the two instruments which satisfies the tax revenue requirement (1.14) is welfare
equivalent. Moreover, welfare is maximized by applying the maximum possible CIT t̄,
yielding effort eSBt̄ . It does not matter whether the government limits deductibility to
αSB = t̄π2+e
SB
t̄
t̄(π1−π2)−B
eSB
t̄
t̄C′(eSBt̄ )
< α∗ while abstaining from a bonus tax, or whether it chooses a
bonus rate tSBb = t̄+µ1+µ > t
∗
b with µ =
B−t̄π2−eSBt̄ t̄(π1−π2)
eSB
t̄
C′(eSBt̄ )
while making bonus payments fully
deductible from the CIT. Any α (tb) = tbt̄ −
1−tb
eSB
t̄
C′(eSBt̄ )t̄
B + 1−tb
eSB
t̄
C′(eSBt̄ )
[π2 + e (π1 − π2)] is
welfare equivalent and induces the principal to incentivize effort eSBt̄ < eSBt∗ . Compared
39It follows that t∗ < 1 whenever B < Bmax with Bmax as defined in footnote 37.
40As we prescind from distributional aspects in our welfare analysis, there is a range of equilibrium
taxes t∗. Any CIT that is large enough to finance the revenue requirement B but is still less than
1 is welfare equivalent to another CIT that fulfills the same requirements. It is only important that
the agent works for the principal and that he exerts optimal second-best effort. The profit of the
principal is irrelevant.
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to the optimal structure of tax instruments (t∗, α∗, t∗b), taxation of bonuses reduces wel-
fare as equilibrium effort will be inefficiently low. Moreover, they are substitutes as they
distort effort and welfare to the same extent.
1.4.3. Increasing Welfare by Subsidizing Bonus Payments
Note that welfare maximizing effort is indirectly defined by (1.15), which in our model can-
not be reached as information asymmetry and limited liability lead to moral hazard. The
principal is faced with a trade-off between efficiency and distribution of rents. Because
of the additional marginal costs of the agent’s limited liability rent 1−αt(1−tb)e
SBC ′′
(
eSB
)
,
the principal can reduce his expected employment costs by inducing lower effort. This
distortion in inducing effort increases the principal’s expected rent E (UP ) at the expense
of the agent’s rent E (UA). Because of reduced efficiency, this goes along with a welfare
loss. Unlike the principal, the government does not pay attention to the distribution of
rents but is only interested in welfare maximization.
With moral hazard and limited liability, a welfare increase can be achieved if the gov-
ernment is allowed to choose corrective tax instruments, i.e. a negative bonus tax or a
very high deductibility of bonus payments (α > 1), while financing these subsidies by
a higher CIT.41 By subsidizing costs related to incentivizing the agent, the government
can reduce the principal’s expected employment costs. This in turn leads the principal
to induce a higher effort level where the effort level with subsidy eSBsub is shifted towards
the welfare maximizing effort e∗. According to (1.10) for second-best effort, this is the
case for small deviations from the equilibrium as long as the tax component 1−αt(1−t)(1−tb) ,
on the right hand side, is smaller than 1. Deviating from any tax system with α ≤ 1 and
tb ≥ 0, the government can increase welfare by choosing tsub > t∗ and financing with the
higher expected revenues either αsub > α∗ = 1 or tsubb < t∗b = 0. This leads to higher net
bonus payments for the agent.
Proposition 1.2 summarizes the results gained above:
Proposition 1.2. Given a tax revenue requirement B, the following tax structures max-
imize welfare:
41This result has been shown in a setting of optimal tax interventions with incomplete insurance markets
by Banerjee and Besley (1990). There, a risk neutral government can use a profit tax to subsidize
and thus reduce the capital market interest rate for the risk-averse agent. By this intervention in the
credit market, welfare can be increased.
23
Fiscal Treatment of Managerial Compensation - a Welfare Analysis
(i) For t, tb ∈ [0, 1) and α ∈ [0, 1], the optimal tax structure is given by
t∗ = B
π2+eSB [π1−π2−C′(eSB)] , full deductibility (α
∗ = 1) and no bonus tax (t∗b = 0).
(ii) If t̄ < t∗, any combination of a bonus tax tb ≥ 0 and deductibility of degree α
(
tb, t̄
)
=
tb
t̄
− 1−tb
eSB
t̄
C′(eSBt̄ )t̄
B + 1−tb
eSB
t̄
C′(eSBt̄ )
[
π2 + eSBt̄ (π1 − π2)
]
≤ 1 is welfare maximizing.
(iii) Allowing for tb < 0 and/or α > 1 is welfare increasing compared to tb ≥ 0 and α ≤ 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The different tax combinations analyzed in the subsections above also influence the dis-
tribution of rents between principal and agent differently. According to (1.9), the agent
gains an expected rent E (UA) = eSBC ′
(
eSB
)
− C
(
eSB
)
. As the marginal expected
rent eSBC ′′
(
eSB
)
is always positive by assumption, the agent’s rent increases when a
higher effort level is incentivized and decreases with a less incentivized effort level. As
eSBt̄ < e
SB
t∗ < e
SB
sub in the cases analyzed above, the agent’s rent is highest when a bonus
subsidy is paid and lowest when the CIT cannot be chosen, but is exogenously given.
The principal’s rent can be expressed by simplifying his maximization problem
(1.4) to
E (UP ) = eSBπ1 +
(
1− eSB
)
π2 − eSBC ′
(
eSB
)
− E (T ) (1.16)
which, by assumption, is strictly concave in eSB and has a global maximum (in the
presence of moral hazard) at the effort satisfying (π1 − π2) =
[
C ′
(
eSB
)
+ eSBC ′′
(
eSB
)]
.
According to the findings above, the principal’s expected rent is maximized for effort eSBt∗
and a tax system t∗ = B
π2+eSBt∗ [π1−π2−C′(eSBt∗ )]
, α∗ and t∗b . Whenever either the bonus tax
or the limited deductibility deviate from their optimal level t∗b and α∗, the principal’s
expected net profit E (UP ) decreases. This is the case for both an exogenous CIT t̄ and
a bonus subsidy (tb < 0 or α > 1).
1.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we used a principal-agent model to study the effects of different tax
treatments of managerial compensation. More precisely a corporate income tax, a special
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tax on bonuses and limited deductibility of bonuses from the corporate income tax were
subject to our analysis. We identified how these tax instruments affect existing managerial
incentives, how they change the design of incentive contracts used in equilibrium and,
keeping total tax revenue constant, what their welfare effects are.
Introducing an additional bonus tax decreases the agent’s net bonus and brings him to
reduce effort. The firm anticipates this reaction in equilibrium and incentivizes a lower
effort level by adjusting the gross bonus paid to the agent. Weighing up the principal’s
(reduced) desired effort and (higher) bonus tax costs, this gross bonus payment can be
higher or lower than it would be without a bonus tax. If the net bonus necessary to induce
the desired effort is sufficiently high, a bonus tax further increases bonus payments to
the agent.
Limited deductibility of bonuses from the corporate income tax base has no direct effect
on the gross- and/or net bonus payment and, thus, on the agent’s incentives. Because
limiting the tax deductibility of bonuses makes bonus payments more costly to the prin-
cipal, in equilibrium he offers a lower bonus rate. This leads to lower effort exerted by
the agent in equilibrium.
This negative effect on effort cannot be found under a corporate income tax with full
deductibility of bonuses thereof. In our setup, this tax has neither an effect on managerial
incentives nor on the design of the incentive contracts used in equilibrium.
In terms of welfare, this makes the corporate income tax superior compared to the other
tax instruments as it does not distort the equilibrium effort induced by the principal be-
yond the adjustment due to moral hazard. Bonus taxation as well as limited deductibility
of bonuses from the corporate income tax are close substitutes in their distortionary ef-
fects when it comes to the decision of how much effort to incentivize. In spite of different
mechanisms, both reduce effort to an inefficiently low level and therewith lead to lower
welfare compared to the situation in which only the CIT is used for tax revenue.
In contrast to reforms of tax treatments of managerial compensation conducted by politi-
cians, the model suggests a corrective tax system which, despite moral hazard, increases
welfare towards the first-best solution. By subsidizing bonus payments to the agent either
via a negative bonus tax or via a deductibility of bonuses higher than 100 percent and
a simultaneous increase in the corporate income tax financing the subsidy, the govern-
ment can reduce the principal’s marginal expected employment costs and thereby increase
equilibrium effort and welfare.
Finally, one can state that both a bonus tax and a limitation of deductibility can be used if
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the government has distributional objectives towards firm owners and managers. Limited
deductibility or a bonus tax should only be used if the objective is to reduce both the
managers’ and firm owners’ rents. This is additional to the disadvantage of inefficiently
low welfare. If welfare is to be maximized, a subsidy on managerial compensation should
be paid to the companies. This results in a higher rent for managers and a lower rent for
firm owners.
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Chapter 2.
Too Many to Fail - How Bonus
Taxation prevents Gambling for
Bailouts
2.1. Introduction
In the recent financial crisis, governments and central banks were faced with troubled
banks and a challenging tradeoff: Either to allow bank insolvencies, leading to contagion
and welfare losses, or to rescue banks, leading to public payments for the private sector.
On top of this tradeoff, there was a public debate on the fairness of high compensation
payments going on, especially in banking industries. Policymakers reacted to this discus-
sion by reforming the tax treatment of managerial compensation, e.g. by imposing bonus
taxes.
This chapter combines three aspects of the financial crisis: (i) the systemic risk of financial
institutions that are not systemic individually, but only on a collective basis, (ii) high
compensation payments to bankers, and (iii) bonus taxation. Analyzing these aspects in a
principal-agent model with two banks, this chapter presents the effects of a) bailouts and
b) bonus taxation on managerial incentives and risk taking. In this model, if agents have
to be incentivized to select a project only when its success probability is high enough,
an anticipated bailout increases risk-taking. Moreover, we show how bonus taxation
can reduce overall risk taking. The results suggest that even unilateral bonus taxation
eliminates an equilibrium with high risk taking and in addition generates positive external
effects on the other country. This contradicts the view of politicians, who emphasized the
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necessity of a coordinated approach with all major economies implementing the bonus
tax jointly.42
There are two main reasons for banks to become systemic: on the one hand, banks may
be large and thereby systemic on an individual level, i.e. they are “too big to fail”. On
the other hand, banks may be too small to be too-big-to-fail, but strongly interconnected
and thereby systemic collectively, i.e. “too many to fail”: For policymakers, it is not
only a bank’s size but also its connection to other banks that is relevant when it comes
to the decision whether or not to bail out failing banks. Irrespective of size, the more
interconnected a bank is, the more systemic it is. This is especially true if banks can
increase the likelihood of a bailout by correlating their investments. In the extreme,
both are either successful, or fail simultaneously, thereby exerting high pressure on the
regulator for a bailout. In this situation, the regulator would like to reduce banks’
incentives to coordinate, but cannot credibly commit to a no bailout-clause.43 These
incentives for banks to coordinate are a core aspect of this chapter and offer new insights
vis-à-vis the existing literature on the too-big-to-fail problem.
Another core aspect are managers’ compensation payments and their taxation. From
an economic point of view, asymmetric information calls for bonus payments in order to
incentivize the agent, manager, to act in the principal’s, bank’s, interest. Nevertheless,
it has been considered unfair that bankers receive high bonus payments whilst taxpayers
have to bear the costs of the bankers’ decisions. As a response, several countries intro-
duced a surtax on managerial bonuses. For the fiscal year 2009-2010, the UK introduced
a 50% bank payroll tax which was levied on bonus payments higher than GBP 25.000
for bankers (UK Finance Act 2010, Schedule 1). Other countries raised bonus taxes for
banks that were supported by the government: In 2011, Ireland introduced a 90% tax,
and the US House of Representatives approved such a 90% tax in 2009.44
The analysis in this chapter leads to the following result: If banks anticipate bailouts,
market discipline weakens, i.e. banks incentivize their bankers to take on higher risk.
In a situation without bonus taxation, banks foresee that they are systemic in a herd
and thus can coordinate on an equilibrium with high risk taking, taking advantage of
42See “For Global Finance, Global Regulation” (Gordon Brown and Nicolas Sarkozy, The Wall Street
Journal 2009, Dec 9): “[...] action that must be taken must be at a global level. No one territory can
be expected to or be able to act on its own.”
43See Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) for an analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies and
a general explanation of the differences between too-big-to-fail and too-many-to-fail.
44See “Ireland to reintroduce 90% bank bonus tax” (guardian.co.uk 2011, Jan 26) and “Bonus Tax Heads
to Senate After House Passes 90% Levy” (bloomberg.com 2009, Mar 20).
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the systemic risk they collectively cause. If, on the other hand, bankers’ bonuses are
taxed properly, then the taxed banker will request a higher gross bonus payment to be
compensated for the additional tax burden. Thereby incentives for risk taking become
more expensive such that a proper bonus tax can circumvent excessive risk taking in
equilibrium. Moreover, for the equilibrium with excessive risk taking to break down,
it is sufficient if only one manager is subject to a bonus tax. A (unilateral) bonus tax
reestablishes market discipline as it prevents market failure that arises due to banks’
collective moral hazard.
2.2. Related Literature
This chapter is related to several strands of literature. In terms of methodology, we draw
on papers dealing with executive compensation and especially with delegated expertise.
Most of these papers focus on optimal contracting by using agency theory.45 A firm
owner has to incentivize a manager to act in his interest but is exposed to an information
asymmetry, which may lead to shirking or moral hazard by the manager. In standard
agency models (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Holmstrom 1979, and Grossman and Hart
1983, among others), agents are typically assumed to exert effort in order to increase (the
probability of high) profits. As (costly) effort is not directly observable by the principal,
an agency problem arises.
In the literature on delegated expertise, a delegated expert can generally acquire superior
information about a random state of nature and then take a decision based on this
information. The principal can only observe the outcome, but does not know on which
information the agent’s decision was based. This creates a conflict of interest. In contrast
to this literature, the chapter at hand abstracts from costs to acquire superior information,
but assumes the agent to already have this expertise.46 Thus, the chapter is most closely
related to Lambert (1986), as the agent does not subsequently receive a noisy signal on
45Another perception on executive compensation is the managerial power approach, mainly brought
forward by Bebchuk et al. (2002), Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Bebchuk and Fried (2004). In
contrast to efficient-contracting, they believe in powerful, rent-seeking agents that are able to influence
their own pay. For an analysis of taxation of rent-seeking activities see Glazer and Konrad (1999)
or Rothschild and Scheuer (2011). Frydman and Jenter (2010) and Murphy (2013) discuss the
contributions in both strands of literature.
46Existing papers differ in their assumptions on costs of information. Some assume fixed costs (Lambert
1986, Gromb and Martimort 2007, Core and Qian 2002), while in others agents can exert continuous
effort that improves information quality (Malcomson 2009, Feess and Walzl 2004, Barron and Waddell
2003).
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the success probability of projects, but observes the actual success probabilities. Given
this knowledge, the agent decides whether or not to invest in a risky project.47 Thus,
the contract must provide sufficient incentives to circumvent moral hazard in deciding
upon an investment. For optimal contracts, Palomino and Prat (2003) have shown that
a bonus contract aligns interests between principal and agent best, when the agent’s task
is to select a portfolio of risky financial assets. Likewise our model, there the agent does
not have to acquire additional information, but has to incur costs in order to be able to
invest in a risky project at all.
A second strand of literature this chapter belongs to is the literature on systemic risk due
to a too-many-to-fail problem. Brown and Dinc (2011) provide empirical evidence for the
too-many-to-fail problem. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) and Acharya (2009) develop
theoretical models to show banks’ incentives for herding and for correlating assets and
returns, especially when they are small in size. In correlating assets, banks increase both
economy-wide aggregate risk and the likelihood that many banks fail together. Acharya
and Yorulmazer (2007) account for the time-inconsistency in bank closure policies, and
Acharya (2009) suggests implementing regulation at a collective level so that banks are
required to hold greater capital against general risk than against specific risk. Farhi and
Tirole (2012) find that anticipated bailouts lead to high levels of short-term debt, high
leverage and wide-scale maturity mismatch and thus to collective moral hazard. They
demand policy intervention by means of a reduction in interest rates and the use of direct
transfers only when a large fraction of banks is affected by a crisis.
The effects of bonus taxation have been studied empirically and theoretically.48 Von
Ehrlich and Radulescu (2012) analyze the effects of the UK bank payroll tax on compen-
sation. Their empirical findings suggest that the bonus tax caused a reduction in bonus
payments of 40%, which, however, was accompanied by a one-to-one increase in other
pay components not subject to the tax.
Theoretically, the effects of bonus taxation have been studied mainly in principal-agent
models. Assuming a risk-averse agent, Dietl et al. (2013) analyze how a bonus tax affects
47Existing models differ in the agent’s choice set. While in Core and Qian (2002), Barron and Waddell
(2003), Feess and Walzl (2004) and Gromb and Martimort (2007) the agent decides upon investing
or not, Lambert (1986), Demski and Sappington (1987) and Malcomson (2009) allow for different
actions to take or projects to choose from.
48A review on the literature on systemic externalities of bank failures is provided by Wagner (2010). For
a broader analysis of proposed and discussed taxes on the financial sector, e.g. a financial transactions
tax, see Shackelford et al. (2010), Keen (2011a) and Devereux (2011). Brunnermeier et al. (2009)
state principles of financial regulation.
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the composition of compensation payments and executives’ incentives to exert effort. The
effects in their model depend on the agent’s degree of risk aversion and the variance in firm
value. By extending the agent’s choice set by risk taking, Grossmann et al. (2012) observe
an effect opposed to ours. Because of risk aversion and marginal costs of risk that decrease
more than marginal revenue from risk-taking, they find that a bonus tax induces the agent
to increase risk-taking.49 A comparison of different ways to implement bonus taxation is
provided in Hilmer (2013). The paper shows that a bonus tax and limited deductibility
of bonus payments from the corporate income tax have similar distortionary effects in
reducing effort and net bonuses and thereby reduce welfare in a similar way. However,
welfare can even be increased by paying a subsidy for bonus payments. Radulescu (2012)
studies the effects of a bonus tax in a two-country framework where reservation wages
are endogenous or exogenous. In her model, a unilateral bonus tax leads to a decline in
effort, while incidence mainly falls on the firm’s shareholders. Results are largely similar
with endogenous reservation wages, but depend on the strength of the negative reaction
of the reservation wage to the bonus tax. Thanassoulis (2012) emphasizes the externality
of competition. He finds that remuneration is increasing when banks compete for the
best teams of bankers. In turn, higher remuneration drives up the expected costs of
bankruptcy of competing banks.
Besley and Ghatak (2013) model bonus taxation in the presence of the externality of
bailouts due to a too-big-to-fail problem and analyze a situation with three groups of
citizens: consumers, financial intermediaries and financial sector workers. They find
that a situation with bailout guarantees and without bonus taxation is inefficient and
inequitable. Moreover, a bonus tax, above and beyond standard progressive income
taxation, can correct the distortion in financial sector workers’ effort and risk-taking a
bailout causes.50
This chapter contributes to the literature by analyzing the effects of anticipated bailouts
on bonus payments and risk taking and the effects of a bonus tax. While the literature
has concentrated on systemic risks due to banks that are too-big-to-fail51, we are the first
49See Buchholz and Konrad (2014) for a recent survey on the possible effects of taxation on risk-taking
activities and the determinants that drive the results.
50Keen (2011b) does not model bonus taxes, but also addresses the problem of taxing or regulating
banks in the presence of systemic risk. He finds that corrective taxation requires a progressive tax
on the bank’s borrowing. Tax policy can be further supported by minimum capital requirements.
51Hakenes and Schnabel (2014) show how bonuses change when bailouts can be anticipated. Similar
to the present model, an anticipated bailout increases bonuses and risk-taking in their analysis. In
contrast to this model, Hakenes and Schnabel (2014), alike Besley and Ghatak (2013), study the
too-big-to-fail problem. In addition, they do not analyze the effects of bonus taxation.
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to study the effects of bonus taxation due to a too-many-to-fail problem. This provides
several new insights: First, the too-big-to-fail argument only applies to large banks that
will individually adjust their activity to maximize profit. In contrast, the too-many-to-
fail analysis is a meaningful extension as it also includes smaller banks and moral hazard
on a collective basis. As the payment of a bailout crucially depends on the decision of
another bank, banks cannot be sure to receive a bailout in all circumstances. This, in
turn, leads to several possible equilibria, with collective moral hazard being one solution.
Second, apart from multiple equilibria, the too-many-to-fail framework with two banks
allows deeper insights when it comes to taxation. This is especially true when fiscal
jurisdiction only covers a subset of banks such that regulation can not capture all banks
collectively. For this analysis, we also examine the effects of bonus taxation that only
addresses one bank, showing that this can prevent possible negative welfare effects that
can arise in case of common bonus taxation.
In the following section, we introduce the general model, derive benchmark results and
analyze the implications of an anticipated too-many-to-fail bailout policy when the man-
agers of both banks simultaneously decide on project implementation. Section 2.4 illus-
trates how a bonus tax leads to reduced risk taking, both when imposed on one manager
or on both managers. Section 1.5 concludes.
2.3. Impact of a Too-Many-to-Fail Bailout Policy on
Project Choice
2.3.1. Model Overview and Available Projects
Consider a situation with two symmetric banks k ∈ {1, 2} that both face an identical
principal-agent structure and the same structures: a risk-neutral shareholder k (principal)
delegates the task of implementing a project to a hired risk-neutral manager k (agent).
The principal offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the manager, whose payoff is subject
to a limited liability constraint and who has an exogenous outside option u = 0 and zero
initial wealth.52 If manager k accepts the contract, he chooses between a risky project Rk
and a safe asset S in which he invests all the bank’s money. Finally, returns are realized
and payments are made.
52It suffices to assure that u ≥ 0. We will later explain the implications of our simplifying assumptions.
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We assume that risks in projects R1 and R2 are perfectly correlated.53 Thus, if both
managers invest into the risky projects Rk, the projects generate the same payoffs for
both banks. All moves as the contract offer and project implementation take place simul-
taneously and are therefore not observable by the other bank. However, strategic choices
available for each bank and the distribution of project returns are common knowledge.
Available Projects With respect to project implementation, investment into Rk causes
a non-monetary fixed cost C > 0 to the manager, while there is no such cost for S.54
After implementation, asset S generates a payoff s in any state of the world, which,
without loss of generality, we normalize to s = 0. For the risky project Rk, possible
returns depend on the state of the world. There are three states of the world with payoffs
rH > s = 0 > −rL and according probabilities Pr (rH | Rk) = pi, Pr (s | Rk) = q and
Pr (−rL | Rk) = (1− pi − q). We assume that pi ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ (0, 1− pi), so that each
return is realized with positive probability. In addition, we assume that Rk is profitable
for some distribution of probabilities (pi, q), while it is not profitable for other distribution
of probabilities (pi, q). For simplicity, we hold q fixed and assume that there exist two
different probabilities pi (with i ∈ {l, h}) that the project yields the high return rH :
pl < ph, with Pr (ph) = γ, Pr (pl) = (1− γ) and γ ∈ (0, 1). While the distribution
of pi, possible returns {rH , 0,−rL}, costs C, and probability γ are common knowledge,
the realization of pi is private information of the manager when it comes to signing the
contract.55
Agency Problem Ex post only realizations {rH , 0,−rL} are observable, but not the
agent’s actual investment. As payoff s = 0 can occur for both asset S and project
Rk, the principal cannot perfectly infer whether the agent has implemented the risky
project or not. This implies a first informational advantage of the manager vis-à-vis the
principal. Next to this, there is a second source of information asymmetry, which regards
the profitability of the risky project Rk. While the manager (as an expert) knows the
actual success probability pi when signing the contract, the principal only knows the
53One could think of these projects as an investment in subprime mortgages.
54Assuming costs for investment into S to be zero is a normalization. Results do not change qualitatively
if we allow for costs of the safe asset CS > 0, as long as C > CS .
55Following Lambert (1986), an agent can also acquire superior information by investing in knowledge
after contract signing. As the focus here is on compensation payments and taxation rather than the
agent’s information acquisition, the assumption of the agent’s exogenous ex ante superior information
simplifies the analysis, but is not crucial.
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distribution of possible success probabilities pi. Thus, the principal cannot observe the
information the manager based his project implementation decision on. This information
asymmetry is especially severe as Rk is profitable only for some probabilities (pi, q). In
order to make this information asymmetry sufficiently severe, we assume that Rk is not
profitable for probability pl and maintain this assumption throughout the rest of the
chapter.
Assumption 2.1. The probability pl is such that pl < CrH .
Compensation Payments There are three states of nature that can possibly occur, with
corresponding payoffs {−rL, 0, rH}. Thus, as compensation for the task of operating the
company and implementing the investment project, the bank can offer a state-contingent
wage with payments (Ak | −rL), (Yk | 0) and (Ak + bkrH | rH). Thereby, the manager
receives fixed wages Ak and Yk if the outcomes are (−rL) and 0, respectively, and a bonus
bk ≥ 0 as a fraction of payoff rH additionally to the fixed wage Ak if the outcome is rH .
Note that the bank has no wealth and can therefore not credibly commit to positive wage
payments for outcomes {−rL, 0}. At the same time, as the agent has zero wealth and is
protected by limited liability, compensation payments {Ak, Yk, Ak + bkrH} are restricted
to be non-negative. This implies Ak = 0 and Yk = 0.56 The agent maximizes his
expected net compensation with respect to his choice of accepting the contract or not
and with respect to his investment choice. In expectation, the manager’s compensation
when implementing the risky project amounts to pibkrH while he faces costs C for this
task.57
2.3.2. First-Best
In order to analyze the agency problem and the impacts of a too-many-to-fail bailout
policy and bonus taxation, we first identify the first-best solution in absence of any
56Yk = 0 is a restriction caused by the assumption s = 0 while Ak = 0 is caused by u. When analyzing the
equilibrium compensation payments, we will discuss the implications of u = 0 and s = 0. Moreover,
the restriction of Ak = 0 is well established in literature (e.g. Besley and Ghatak, 2013) for similar
cases.
57The manager is faced with a tradeoff on the extensive margin rather than on the intensive margin
(e.g. between marginal expected bonus and marginal effort costs). This chapter abstracts from effort
choices as the focus shall be on the effects of bonus taxation on the implementation of risky projects
(in contrast to distortions of managerial effort). For the effects of a bonus tax on managerial effort,
see Radulescu (2012), Dietl et al. (2013) or Hilmer (2013).
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externality (like the bailout later introduced). As maximization problems of banks k = 1
and k = 2 are independent in absence of externalities, we omit the subscript k for
notational convenience for the time being.
In first-best, efficiency is maximal as the bank can observe project implementation, as it
knows the realization pi and as it maximizes its payoff by directly choosing the optimal
investment policy. An optimal compensation scheme for the principal pays the manager
his implementation costs C whenever he implements the risky project and zero if he does
not.58 For these compensation costs and in absence of an agency problem, the principal
wants to implement the project as long as his expected net payoff equals or exceeds the
compensation costs, i.e. pirH + (1− pi − q) (−rL) ≥ C.
Lemma 2.1. An investment decision is efficient if and only if pi ≥ C+(1−q)rLrH+rL ≡ p̂
opt.
2.3.3. Second-Best Risk Choices without Bailouts
In presence of the agency problem, both managers will again accept any contract for
which their expected compensation equals or exceeds costs C. As the agents’ expected
net-compensation pibrh is linear in pi, there exists a threshold p̂ which determines whether
or not to accept the contract. This threshold p̂ is characterized by a binding Participation
Constraint given the bonus payment b:
p̂ = C
brH
. (2.1)
Optimization Problem Principal Taking the manager’s optimality condition (2.1) into
account, the principal in the first stage chooses a bonus parameter b which maximizes his
expected payoff E (π). As the principal only knows the distribution of {pl, ph} and their
likelihood to occur (γ and (1− γ)), his maximization problem is:
58Due to the bank’s restriction on A and Y , a feasible and equivalent payment is b = CrH whenever rH
is realized.
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max
b
(1− γ) [pl (1− b) rH + (1− pl − q) (−rL)] +
+γ [ph (1− b) rH + (1− ph − q) (−rL)] (2.2)
s.t. pibrH ≥ C (2.3)
Equation (2.3) is the agent’s participation constraint (PC), which the principal has to
consider as the agent will only accept the principal’s contract offer if his expected com-
pensation at least remunerates him for the exogenous costs C ∈ R+ of implementing the
risky project.59
For the Principal, it is clearly optimal to choose a bonus payment which makes the agent’s
optimality condition (2.1) binding for the lowest probability p∗i for which he wants to
implement the risky project, thus p̂ ∈ {pl, ph} and b∗ ∈
{
C
phrH
, C
plrH
}
. For the first bonus
payment, the agent accepts the contract only for a probability ph, while he accepts the
contract for ph and pl if he receives the latter (steeper) bonus. Suppose a principal wants
the manager to implement the risky project R if the probability for rH is pi = ph, thus
p̂ = ph. If he pays a bonus b < CphrH , the manager rejects the principal’s contract offer
both when he observes pl or ph. If, on the other hand, the principal offers a bonus
b > C
phrH
, he pays a higher bonus than needed to incentivize the manager to accept the
contract for ph. This unnecessarily high bonus leaves a rent to the manager and lowers
the principal’s payoff. Therefore it cannot be optimal for him and optimal compensation
for p̂ = ph is given by bh = CphrH . The same argument as above applies if the principal
wants to implement R for both pl and ph. For p̂ = pl, optimal compensation is given by
bl = C
plrH
.
Equilibrium In order to determine the optimal investment strategy, the principal com-
pares the two expected payoffs E
(
πl
)
and E
(
πh
)
when incentivizing p̂ = pl or p̂ = ph.
Substituting the respective optimal compensation schemes bh and bl into the expected
payoff (2.2), we get:
59Note: an Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC) is not necessary for this maximization problem. As
u = 0, Y = 0 and C > 0, the ICC for implementing R rather than S (given by pibrH + qY −C ≥ Y )
is fulfilled whenever the PC (pbrH + qY − C ≥ u) is fulfilled.
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E
(
πl
)
= (1− γ) [plrH − C − (1− pl − q) rL] +
+γ
[
phrH −
ph
pl
C − (1− ph − q) rL
]
(2.4)
E
(
πh
)
= 0 + γ [phrH − C − (1− ph − q) rL] (2.5)
Equation (2.4) denotes the principal’s expected payoff E
(
πl
)
if he incentivizes the man-
ager to accept the contract for all pi ≥ p̂ = pl. In order to do so, and, as for pl the
probability of receiving the bonus is low compared to ph, the principal has to give a high
share b in order to compensate the manager for his implementation costs C. As b stays
constant but the success probability is higher for ph, the manager in expectation gets
compensated for C if the actual probability is pl, but earns a rent
(
ph
pl
− 1
)
C if it is ph.
In return, the principal increases his probability of investing into the risky project (i.e.
that the manager accepts the contract and implements R), thereby increasing the chance
(risk) to earn rH (lose rL).
However, if the principal only incentivizes acceptance of the high probability ph (denoted
by (2.5)), he pays a bonus bh which in expectation perfectly compensates the agent for
the implementation costs C if the actual success probability is ph. Hence, the agent will
not accept the contract if pi = pl and the principal earns 0 with probability (1− γ).
Lemma 2.2. Suppose that Assumption 2.1 holds. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium
(b∗, p̂∗) in which both principals choose to offer a bonus rate b∗ = bh = C
phrH
if and only
if
ph ≥
C + (1− q) rL
rH + rL
≡ p̂∗. (2.6)
Both agents accept the contract and implement the risky project for all ph ≥ p̂∗. Other-
wise, no contract will be signed.
Proof. Directly follows from a comparison of (2.4) and (2.5). Due to Assumption 2.1,
E
(
πl
)
< E
(
πh
)
. E
(
πh
)
≥ 0 if and only if ph ≥ C+(1−q)rLrH+rL .
Due to Assumption 2.1, pl is too small to generate a positive expected payoff. Conse-
quently, as the principal maximizes expected payoff, he offers a bonus bh to the agent,
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who will only accept the contract if pi = ph. For the principal, this is only profitable if
the success probability ph is high enough, i.e. ph ≥ C+(1−q)rLrH+rL as only then the principal
earns an expected payoff E
(
πh
)
≥ 0.60
For this result and the following analysis, the simplification s = u = 0 has no qualitative
implications. Instead, it has a level effect on the principal’s expected payoff for both the
safe and the risky investment (as the principal does not have to compensate the manager
for his reservation wage u) and a constant effect on the tradeoff between implementing
the risky project R rather than the safe asset S (depending on the difference (s− u)).
Suppose u > s > 0. Then, the principal could pay a maximum fixed wage Y = s, but
would still need a bonus to incentivize the agent correctly. Due to u > s, S is never
profitable for the principal while R is only if ph is large enough. If, on the other hand,
s > u > 0, S is always profitable. Still, R is more profitable for some pi. Thus, the
principal again needs a bonus payment to incentivize the agent correctly. In addition, it
will not be optimal for the principal to pay Y > u.61 This either results in suboptimal
rent payments to the agent or in the agent always choosing S rather than R.62
2.3.4. Second-Best Risk Choices with a Too-Many-to-Fail Bailout
Policy
Up to this point, there was no difference with respect to bank’s strategies or payoffs
vis-à-vis a one-bank case. This changes when introducing a “too many to fail” problem:
banks’ losses are possibly carried over by a bailout. This implies a modification regarding
project implementation choices of banks: next to individual choices, collective risk choices
60In the absence of Assumption 2.1, the results of Lemma 2.2 hold if γ
(
ph
pl
− 1
)
C >
(1− γ) (plrH − C − (1− pl − q) rL): the principal’s increase in expected payoff by implementing pl
and ph rather than only ph, i.e. (1− γ) (plrH − C − (1− pl − q) rL), is smaller than the additional
expected incentive costs of a rent to the agent, i.e. γ
(
ph
pl
− 1
)
C.
61If Y > u, the agent shirks and never implements R unless the principal increases b above b∗, causing
rent payments to the manager. If b = b∗, both principal and manager are indifferent in absence of
bonus taxation for all remaining 0 ≤ Y ≤ min {s, u}. With bonus taxation, Y optimally satisfies
Y = min {s, u}.
62The following holds for the fixed wage A if the principal could pay A > 0: due to Assumption 2.1, a
bonus is still necessary in order for the agent to implement Rk only for ph. Otherwise, the manager
would also implement the project for pl, and thereby harm the principal. Neglecting Assumption 2.1,
the principal may want to incentivize also the probability pl. He could pay a fixed wage A = C1−q
and b = 0, the agent would accept the contract for all pi without having an agency problem in the
project choice. With bonus taxation, this is the only case where the restriction on A = 0 makes a
qualitative difference.
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now matter for the likelihood of a bailout.
The “Too Many to Fail” Problem Assume the government can decide whether it
grants financial support to financially distressed banks.63 For this decision, it has to
weigh gains of a bailout (corresponding to welfare costs associated with bank insolvencies)
against the cost associated with the bailout. In order to analyze the implications of a
too-many-to-fail bailout policy, we make the following assumption that imposes too-
many-to-fail:
Assumption 2.2. Banks receive a bailout covering their losses rL only if both banks fail
simultaneously. If only one bank fails, no bailout takes place.
Banks are not systemic on an individual basis but only on a collective basis. This yields
the too-many-to-fail problem if more than one bank fails. As a result, society is able to
stand one failing bank and therefore will not pay a bailout if the bank invested in a risky
project and failed. If however both banks invest into their risky projects at the same
time, then both fail together. As financial markets cannot be sustained if both banks fail
at the same time, both banks will receive a bailout.
Equilibrium with Anticipated Bailouts Banks may expect a bailout, as defined above,
either because of explicit communication about a bailout or because they anticipate
the welfare losses a breakup of the financial system would cause. If banks expect a
bailout, they may change their bonus payments and risk taking in equilibrium. If they
take different actions, i.e. if one bank incentivizes risk taking and the other bank does
not, banks still earn expected payoffs E
(
πlk
)
and E
(
πhk
)
as denoted in (2.4) and (2.5).
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy of project implementation for ph ≥ p̂∗ as denoted in
Lemma 2.2 still applies, individually as well as collectively.
If, however, both banks take the same decision, they either both fail, or none. Taking
into account that they receive a bailout in the bad state, so that rL = 0, banks’ expected
payoffs are given by:64
63Next to a direct cash-payment to failed banks, a bailout can also be interpreted as various institutions
granting financial support to financially distressed banks, e.g. non-standard measures by the ECB or
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) by the US government.
64Where superscript “B” denotes the case of a bailout.
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E
(
πlBk
)
= (1− γ) [plrH − C] + γ
[
phrH −
ph
pl
C
]
(2.7)
E
(
πhBk
)
= γ [phrH − C] (2.8)
Comparing (2.7) and (2.8), the principal has to prove which cutoff probability pBi ∈[
pBl , p
B
h
]
yields higher expected payoff, and whether in expectation he can reckon with
positive payoffs at all for the respective cutoff probability p̂B = pl or p̂B = ph. Due
to Assumption 2.1, E
(
πhBk
)
> E
(
πlBk
)
∀γ, and therefore the principal will, if at all,
incentivize the agent to implement the project for the success probability ph. As an
incentive payment for ph, he still has to pay a bonus bhk = CphrH . However, when both
banks invest into Rk, a bailout erases the principals’ downside of the risky project and
increases their expected payoffs E
(
πiBk
)
. Ceteris paribus, project Rk now yields a non-
negative payoff E
(
πhBk
)
already if ph ≥ CrH := p̂
B, given both banks invested.
Let us focus on success probabilities ph ∈ [p̂B, p̂∗), for which project implementation is
profitable only collectively. By Assumption 2.2, whether or not there is a bailout depends
upon the other bank’s decision and so do equilibrium strategies. Suppose bank 2 does not
implement the project. Then, the project yields a negative expected payoff for bank 1 as
E
(
πh1
)
< 0 for ph < p̂∗. Thus, each bank has two strategic choices with respect to the
offered incentive payments for the manager, depending on the other bank’s action: either,
it will choose to pay a bonus bhk that optimally incentivizes the manager to implement the
project for ph, or the bank does not offer an appropriate bonus. Then, the manager will
reject the contract and thus the project is not going to be implemented. This gives us four
combinations of banks’ implementation decisions for success probabilities ph ∈ [p̂B, p̂∗).
Computing the corresponding payoffs shows that there exist two pure strategy Nash
Equilibria for success probabilities ph ∈ [p̂B, p̂∗):
Lemma 2.3. Suppose Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. Then, for success probabilities
ph ∈ [p̂B, p̂∗), there exist two pure strategy equilibria where either
1. both principals refrain from project implementation and do not offer a contract to the
manager,
2. or both principals implement the project by offering a bonus rate bhk = CphrH .
The symmetric Nash Equilibrium with project implementation is payoff dominant com-
pared to refraining.
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Proof. Banks’ mutual best responses are “do not offer contract if other bank does not
offer contract” and “offer bonus bh1 if the other bank offers bh2”. Deviations from these
strategies yield at least weakly lower expected payoffs. As E
(
πhBk
)
> 0 for ph ∈ [p̂B, p̂∗),
the latter equilibrium is payoff dominant compared to a payoff zero of “do not offer”.
In the first case, suppose bank 1 refrains from offering a contract. By Assumption 2.2,
irrespectively of bank 2’s action, there will not be a bailout. If bank 2 implements the
project anyway, it risks to fail as a single, non-systemic bank and therefore does not
receive a bailout. Hence, bank 2 has to bear possible losses itself and earns an expected
payoff according to (2.5). However, as stated in Lemma 2.2, project implementation
without bailout is only profitable if ph ≥ p̂∗. Thus, if ph ∈ [p̂B, p̂∗), the best response by
bank 2 is to refrain from the project as well.
In the second case, assume bank 1 wants to implement the project and offers a bonus
bh1 = CphrH . Bank 2 then can be sure to receive a bailout if it implements the project as well
and fails. As a bailout makes investments profitable also for probabilities ph ∈ [p̂B, p̂∗),
the best response by bank 2 to higher risk taking by bank 1 is to also increase risk taking.
In contrast to the one-bank case, the bank now neglects the expected costs of failing as
those are going to be socialized. With an anticipated bailout, the government provides
an externality to the bank such that the banks’ private marginal benefits from risk-taking
increase. Consequently, the bank takes more risk than it would do on an individual basis.
2.3.5. Welfare Implications of Collective Moral Hazard
Whether an increase in risk taking is socially desirable or not depends on its welfare
implications and thus on assumptions on the welfare function and the success proba-
bilities pi. Lemma 2.1 shows the banks’ efficient investment decision in absence of any
externalities. We take this as a benchmark. While a bailout itself is welfare improving
compared to the case where both banks go bankrupt, it leads to the undesired risk taking
effects. Comparing the cutoff levels with information asymmetry p̂∗ and with distorted
risk taking due to an anticipated bailout p̂B to the efficient investment decision defined
above shows the following:
Proposition 2.1. Suppose Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. Then, there exists a payoff
dominant equilibrium where both banks implement Rk for ph ≥ p̂B, while the socially
desirable level they decide upon on an individual level is ph ≥ p̂opt, with p̂opt > p̂B.
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Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 2.1 - 2.3. As p̂B < p̂opt, a cutoff p̂B for ph is not
socially desirable, whereas p̂∗ = p̂opt is.
Proposition 2.1 demonstrates how banks change their project implementation decision,
and consequently also their risk taking when they can anticipate bailouts. While infor-
mation asymmetry between principal and agent does not affect welfare (as p̂∗ = p̂opt),
the presence of a too-many-to-fail bailout policy does. Both principals can increase their
expected payoff by incentivizing more risk taking. While principals have to bear real risks
and losses in the absence of a bailout, they do not suffer losses in the presence of a bailout.
This increases the bank’s marginal benefits from risk-taking and provides the incentives
to accept risky projects also for lower success probabilities which principals would not
incentivize their manager for in the absence of a bailout. Project implementation be-
comes profitable for success probabilities below the socially desired level, p̂B < p̂opt. As
a bailout will only be executed if two banks fail at the same time, Lemma 2.3 highlights
that higher risk taking is indeed an equilibrium if banks anticipate the bailout policy.
Moreover, this equilibrium is payoff dominant for banks compared to the equilibrium
where both banks refrain from implementing the project for ph ∈ [p̂B, p̂∗). Thus, when
banks anticipate bailouts due to a too-many-to-fail systemic risk, they can coordinate on
a socially undesirable equilibrium where both increase their risk taking by implementing
risky projects also for low success probabilities.
2.4. Impact of a Bonus Tax
To analyze the welfare effects of a bonus tax in the presence of too-many-to-fail bailout
policies, we introduce an additional stage into the model: before the take-it-or-leave-it
contract is offered to the manager, the government can implement a bonus tax. When
it is implemented, bonus payments become subject to a bonus tax tb ∈ [0; 1) that has to
be paid by the managers. Therefore, with a gross compensation pibkrH , managers only
receive expected net-compensation payments of pi (1− tb) bkrH < pibkrH if they accept
the contract.
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2.4.1. Effects of a Tax on Managers’ Bonuses
Due to the manager’s additional tax burden, his optimal threshold level p̂ changes from
(2.1) to:
p̂t = C(1− tb) btkrH
. (2.9)
As seen above, an expected bailout influences possible additional profits by eliminating
the risk of losing rL. The newly introduced bonus tax, in turn, acts as a Pigouvian tax
and affects the costs of incentive payments. For a given bonus b, a bonus tax leads,
compared to p̂B, to an increased threshold level p̂t for the minimum success probability
for which the manager accepts the contract in the presence of a bonus tax. Otherwise,
if the principal wants to incentivize a given threshold level p̂, the bonus payment bt to
the manager has to increase in a way such that the manager is fully compensated for
the bonus tax. While net incentive payments to the agent stay constant, the principal’s
costs thereof increase the higher the bonus tax is. Hence, a bonus tax is associated with
higher costs for the principal in expectation, either in terms of lost expected profits due
to a higher threshold probability, or in terms of higher compensation payments.
Compared to (2.7) and (2.8), the principal now additionally takes into account the costs
associated with the bonus tax when deciding upon the optimal threshold probability p̂t.
Expected payoffs change to E
(
πltk
)
and E
(
πhtk
)
:65
E
(
πltk
)
= (1− γ)
[
plrH −
C
(1− tb)
]
+ γ
[
phrH −
ph
pl
C
(1− tb)
]
(2.10)
E
(
πhtk
)
= γ
[
phrH −
C
(1− tb)
]
(2.11)
Whether or not a bonus tax can reverse the principal’s distorted risk taking of ph ≥ p̂B
in the presence of bailouts back to the benchmark threshold ph ≥ p̂opt depends upon the
extent to which bonuses are taxed. In order to be profitable for the principal to incentivize
the manager to implement the project solely for ph ≥ p̂∗, the cutoff probability under
taxation p̂t must equal the optimal cutoff probability p̂∗ defined in Lemma 2.2. Then, a
65Where superscript “t” denotes the case of a bailout together with a (possible) tax on bonuses.
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proper bonus tax can be effective in reversing the threshold for the success probability,
in spite of bailouts, back to the benchmark level. The necessary tax rate is given by
t∗b =
rL((1−q)rH−C)
rH((1−q)rL+C) . With this bonus tax t
∗
b , incentives change for both principals compared
to a situation without bonus taxation as for any bonus payment principals now bear
costs of b1−tb rather than only b. This increases costs and makes projects (intendedly)
unattractive that are profitable without a bonus tax.
Lemma 2.4. Suppose Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. If the government introduces a
bonus tax t∗b =
rL((1−q)rH−C)
rH((1−q)rL+C) , then,
1. for ph < p̂t = p̂∗, banks will not implement the risky project.
2. for ph ∈ [p̂t, p̂t2), there exist two symmetric pure strategy equilibria, in which both
principals either refrain from project implementation or implement the project by offering
a bonus rate bhtk = C(1−t∗b)phrH
. The Nash Equilibrium with project implementation is payoff
dominant.
3. for ph ≥ p̂t2, there exists a unique equilibrium in which both principals implement the
project by offering a bonus rate bhtk .
Proof. If tb = t∗b , E
(
πhtk
)
≥ 0 if and only if ph ≥ p̂∗. Individually, i.e. without bailout,
expected payoff γ
[
phrH − C1−t∗
b
− (1− ph − q) rL
]
≥ 0 if and only if ph ≥ p̂t2 ≡
(1−q)rL
rH+rL +
rH [(1−q)rL+C]
(rH+rL)2
.
As Lemma 2.4 describes, with bonus taxation there exist two threshold levels p̂t and p̂t2
for the success probability ph. This gives us three possible ranges for ph to lie in. First,
suppose ph < p̂t. For this range, the incentive payments necessary to align the manager’s
interest with the principal’s are too high to make it profitable to invest in the risky project.
Banks independently of each other will not implement the risky project anymore. That
is, the tax t∗b is effective in reversing the threshold probability from p̂B = CrH with bailout-
externality back to the second-best threshold p̂t = p̂∗ = C+(1−q)rL
rH+rL . Thereby, the bonus
tax exactly balances the externality a bailout entails and reduces the banks’ incentives
for risk taking to the socially desired level.66 If, however, ph ≥ p̂t, there exists another
threshold level p̂t2 that constitutes whether project implementation is profitable both
individually and collectively, or only collectively. Whenever ph ≥ p̂t2, implementing Rk
66If tb < t∗b , socially undesirable investment is still profitable if undertaken collectively, i.e. p̂t < p̂opt. If
tb > t
∗
b , the bonus tax prevents socially optimal risk taking. In this case, banks incentivize too little
risk taking, i.e. p̂∗ < p̂t.
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is profitable for both banks individually (and consequently collectively). Also without
receiving a bailout, success probabilities ph ≥ p̂t2 are high enough to guarantee a positive
expected payoff. Thus, both principals incentivize their agents to implement Rk. Agents
receive a bonus bhtk = C(1−t∗b)phrH
which perfectly compensates them for the bonus tax t∗b .
Therefore, bhtk is larger than the bonus bhk in absence of taxation. However, in the medium
range ph ∈ [p̂t, p̂t2), two symmetric equilibria exist. For probabilities ph ∈ [p̂t, p̂t2) it is
only profitable to implement Rk if the other bank also implements R−k. Taking the risk
on an individual basis is too expensive and in expectation leads to losses. Thus, either
both banks offer a contract with a bonus bhtk , or none of them does. As in Lemma 2.3, the
Nash Equilibrium with project implementation payoff dominates the equilibrium with
abstaining from project implementation.
2.4.2. Welfare Implications of a Bonus Tax
From Proposition 2.1 we know the welfare effects caused by a too-many-to-fail bailout
policy. Collective moral hazard leads to increased risk taking, such that banks implement
projects with success probabilities lower than the socially desired level p̂B < p̂opt. Com-
paring the results of Lemma 2.3 to the findings denoted in Lemma 2.4, we can state the
following with respect to bonus taxation:
Proposition 2.2. Suppose Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. Then,
1. for the payoff dominant equilibrium with collective moral hazard, a bonus tax t∗b is
welfare improving if ph < p̂t and welfare neutral if ph ≥ p̂t.
2. for the payoff dominated equilibrium, a bonus tax t∗b is welfare neutral if ph < p̂t or
ph ≥ p̂t2, and welfare decreasing if ph ∈ [p̂t, p̂t2).
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.3 and 2.4. As p̂t = p̂opt for t∗b ,
a bonus tax t∗b induces p̂opt in the payoff dominant equilibrium. For the payoff dominated
equilibrium without collective moral hazard, t∗b shifts the threshold from p̂opt to p̂t2.
Welfare effects of a bonus tax depend on two threshold levels p̂t and p̂t2 for the success
probability ph. Further, welfare effects crucially depend on whether the equilibrium with
project implementation or the equilibrium with abstention is realized. Remember that
p̂t = p̂∗ = p̂opt for tb = t∗b and let us first focus on the welfare effects for the payoff domi-
nant equilibrium with project implementation and collective moral hazard. For ph < p̂t,
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banks implement Rk in the absence of bonus taxation although it is not socially desir-
able (p̂B < p̂opt). For this range of ph, a bonus tax t∗b non-ambiguously prevents project
implementation (Lemma 2.4) and thus increases welfare. For all remaining possible prob-
abilities ph ≥ p̂t, a bonus tax t∗b does not cause welfare effects as, according to Lemma 2.1,
banks should invest for ph ≥ p̂opt. In this equilibrium, both banks do invest irrespective
of a bonus tax.
In contrast to the welfare improving effect of a bonus tax in the presence of collective
moral hazard, a bonus tax can be welfare decreasing in the payoff dominated equilibrium
where banks abstain from implementing the risky project. In this equilibrium, a bonus
tax tries to balance the externality of a bailout that does not lead to distortions in the
first place. While the presence of a bailout does not distort risk taking from the socially
desirable threshold p̂∗ = p̂opt, a bonus tax does. Any bonus tax tb > 0 ceteris paribus
lowers banks’ payoffs and thereby distorts their optimization problem. As a result, banks
will only implement the risky project if ph ≥
C
1−tb
+(1−q)rL
rH+rL . As
C
1−tb
+(1−q)rL
rH+rL > p̂
opt if tb > 0,
any bonus tax leads to inefficiently low risk taking.
As a side effect of bonus taxation, banks not only reduce risk taking, but also bear higher
incentive payments for the manager due to the bonus tax. As a result, banks earn less
when a bonus tax is introduced. The difference between both payoffs exactly equals the
bonus tax revenue the government collects.
2.4.3. Extension: Supranational Bailout, but National Bonus
Taxation
One of the main characteristics of the banking sector is its degree of integration, also
across countries.67 When studying the effects of a bonus tax in a stylized international
framework, it is valuable to analyze a situation of discriminatory bonus taxation. This
allows us to examine the effects of bonus taxation that only addresses one bank and thus
the effects of unilateral bonus taxation, when cross-national coordination is not possible.68
In the international context, bailouts linked to systemic risk due to a too-many-to-fail
67As financial markets have integrated more and more in the last decades, also cross-border banking has
increased (Allen et al., 2011). Degryse et al. (2010) show that this increase in cross-border banking
also caused an increase of financial contagion by banks.
68For supranational regulation, cross-national coordination is necessary but often difficult to implement.
Hence, discriminatory taxation is equivalent to a situation where banks are located in different coun-
tries with different fiscal jurisdiction but within a single economic area.
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problem are often executed by supranational organizations like central banks in order
to prevent contagion. For financially distressed banks in the Eurozone for example, the
ECB introduced non-standard monetary policy measures in order to “keep contagion in
financial markets contained.”69 As a result, bank regulation at the moment still is mainly
a national responsibility, whereas resolution is undertaken already on a supranational
level.
This institutional setup is captured by an extension of the model: Suppose only manager
1 is subject to a bonus tax. Hence, for manager 1 the optimality condition under the
presence of a bonus tax (2.9) applies, whereas for manager 2 the optimality condition
without taxation (2.1) is relevant. Consequently, bank 1 incurs higher costs to incentivize
the manager and therefore earns an expected payoff (2.10) or (2.11), while bank 2’s
expected payoffs are given by (2.7) and (2.8). Thus, mutual best responses by bank 1
and 2 are not symmetric anymore and lead to the following results:
Lemma 2.5. Suppose Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. If only manager 1 is subject to
a bonus tax tb = t∗b , there exists a unique equilibrium where both principals choose to
incentivize project implementation if and only if
ph ≥ p̂t = p̂opt. (2.12)
Banks offer a bonus rate bht1 and bh2 and earn payoffs E
(
πht1
)
and E
(
πhB2
)
. Government
1 raises expected tax revenue T = γ t
∗
b
(1−t∗b)
C.
Proof. If tb = t∗b , E
(
πht1
)
≥ 0 if and only if ph ≥ p̂t. If bank 1 implements R1 only for
ph ≥ p̂t, bank 2’s best response is to follow this strategy.
Proper taxation can reduce risk taking of both banks to a level that would have been
implemented also in absence of bailouts. In doing this, a taxation of bonuses of manager
1 imposes an externality not only on bank 1, but also on bank 2. This follows from the
increase in necessary incentive payments to the manager such that bank 1 is not willing
to finance those costs anymore. As a result, the equilibrium with project implementa-
tion, which is payoff dominant for ph ∈ [p̂B, p̂∗) without bonus taxation, becomes payoff
69See ECB (2010, 2011) on the ECB’s response to the financial crisis and its impacts. Among standard
measures such as lowering key interest rates to historically low levels, measures included long lasting
Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs), extension of assets accepted as eligible collateral and
purchase of euro-denominated covered bonds (EUR 60 billion program).
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dominated for the taxed bank. Although it stays a payoff dominant response for bank 2
to implement the project for ph ∈ [p̂B, p̂∗) when bank 1 implements the project as well,
it is no longer a mutual best response in presence of taxation: As the untaxed bank 2
always incentivizes project implementation for ph ≥ p̂∗, it is profitable for bank 1 to do
so as well. On the other hand, as bank 1 abstains from implementation for ph ∈ [p̂B, p̂∗),
it is also not profitable for bank 2 to invest for ph ∈ [p̂B, p̂∗). Due to this fact, there is
a unique equilibrium where both banks incentivize their agents to implement the project
for the high success probability ph ≥ p̂∗, but prevent project implementation by means
of compensation for ph < p̂∗.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. Then, a bonus tax t∗b that
covers only one bank is welfare improving if ph < p̂t and welfare neutral if ph ≥ p̂t.
Proof. Directly follows from Proposition 2.1 and Lemma 2.3 and 2.5.
With respect to welfare, bonus taxation of only one bank eliminates the equilibrium with
higher risk taking and leads to a reduction of risk taking of both banks, the taxed one
and the untaxed one. At the same time, bonus taxation of a single bank unambiguously
cannot cause negative welfare effects unlike when both banks are taxed and they do
not coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium. In this sense, taxing the bonus of
only one bank manager is welfare equivalent to a taxation of both banks when banks
choose the equilibrium with collective moral hazard. Whenever there is a chance that
banks abstain from collective moral hazard and implement projects only when they are
profitable individually, unilateral or discriminatory taxation is welfare superior.
2.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we modeled a symmetric principal-agent structure with two banks where
the agents’ task was the implementation of a project of a certain risk profile. This was
used to study the effects of too-many-to-fail bailout policies and bonus taxation on risk
taking, compensation and welfare.
With respect to the effects of bailout policies, the following has been shown: If banks
can anticipate bailouts due to a too-many-to-fail bailout policy it is profitable for them
to incentivize agents to implement the project also for lower success probabilities. Thus,
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if banks foresee that they are systemic in a herd, they invest riskier than they would do
in the absence of a possible bailout.
Introducing a bonus tax can reduce the risk taking externality a bailout causes. If the
bank manager is taxed by a bonus tax, he requests a higher gross bonus payment to be
compensated for the additional tax burden. Thereby incentive payments for risk taking
become more expensive for the bank. Given that the bonus tax rate is properly chosen,
the increase in expenses leads to lower risk taking by the manager. Due to the specialty of
too-many-to-fail bailout policies and their dependency on collective bankruptcy, reduced
risk taking in one bank also leads to lower risk taking in the other bank. Thus, it is
sufficient that only the manager of one bank is taxed by a bonus tax. Translating this
into a multi-country framework leads to the result that unilateral bonus taxation can
prevent risk taking in the other country and thereby improve welfare in both countries.
The implications of the model for real world policy under the stated assumptions are the
following: Proper bonus taxation reduces banks’ risk taking. Beyond that, there is no
need for a coordinated (global) approach in order to implement actions to reduce risk
taking in banking and gambling for bailouts on a cross-national level. Even a unilateral
bonus tax without global coordination is effective in reducing risk taking in the taxing
country and additionally has a positive externality on other countries. It not only reduces
the gamble for bailouts for the taxed bank, but also increases market discipline of other
banks with lower risk taking also in countries without bonus taxes. Thus, a single country
can circumvent gambling for bailouts on its own, fixing risk incentives at the same level
as without bailouts. A limitation of this model is the omission of negative externalities
on the taxing country, as in this model taxation only has distributional consequences but
does not harm overall welfare in the taxing country.
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Chapter 3.
Bailouts, Bonuses and Bankers’
Short-Termism
3.1. Introduction
When governments in the recent financial crisis had little choice but to avoid contagion
and to rescue banks by using public money, politicians and policymakers started looking
for the underlying causes of the financial crisis. In compensation payments for bankers,
they found one key factor for the excessive risk culture in some banks. Especially high
bonuses were thought of inducing bankers to take on too much risk and to focus on short-
term rather than on sustainable long-term profits.70 As a consequence and to address
this issue for the future, policymakers around the world responded to the heated public
debate by limiting compensation payments of executives or by revising the tax treatment
of bonus payments. Notwithstanding its effects on long-term profits, it is fully rational
that bankers adjust their investment decision to their offered compensation structure.
When banks largely base their bankers’ compensation on short-term profits, bankers will
prefer projects with higher expected profits in the short-run over projects with higher
expected long-term profits. However, the question regarding the determinants of incentive
provision in banking remains.
In the following, we offer a two period principal-agent model that deals with this question
and that combines three aspects of the financial crisis: (i) the time-horizon of investments,
(ii) the systemic risk of financial institutions and (iii) bonus taxation. First, we analyze
70In the UK, for example, the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons asserted that the “‘bonus
culture’ in the City of London(...) contributed to excessive risk-taking and short-termism and thereby
played a contributory role in the banking crisis” (UK House of Commons, 2009).
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the determinants of compensation payments and the time-horizon of investments when
the bank is faced with moral hazard both with respect to effort and managerial short-
termism. In a second step, we introduce the externality of a bailout. This allows us
to focus on whether a bailout policy affects the composition of short-term and long-
term compensation and whether banks tolerate or even incentivize (higher) short-termism
of their bankers. Finally, we pick up the discussion on reforms of the tax treatment
of managerial compensation and analyze the effects of a tax specifically on short-term
bonuses.
Much attention has been paid to the role of bonuses within the financial services industry.
As Suntheim (2011) finds, mean total compensation for chief executive officers (CEO) in
the financial services industry is $3.6 million, with roughly 60% paid as bonuses. While
bonuses have an advantageous effect on the alignment of interests and therefore are a
heavily used compensation instrument within this industry, they also come at a cost.
For instance, the UK Financial Services Authority (2008) states in a letter to CEOs on
remuneration policies that “in many cases the remuneration structures of firms may have
been inconsistent with sound risk management”. Even banks themselves know about
the effects of compensation: In an industry survey on compensation practices among
wholesale banking businesses, 98% of respondents affirm the Institute of International
Finance (2009) that compensation practices were an underlying factor for the financial
crisis. This is especially true for cash bonuses which in the financial sector are well above
the cash bonus payments in non-financial firms (Von Ehrlich and Radulescu, 2012). De
facto, Livne et al. (2013) empirically identify that cash bonuses to CEOs are positively
correlated with the bank’s intensity of short-term investments. We cover this aspect
in a theoretical framework by modeling moral hazard both with respect to effort and
short-termism, and by giving the bank two incentive instruments: short-term bonuses
and long-term bonuses. However, the bank faces a tradeoff. While short-term bonuses
provide incentives for short-termism, long-term compensation is more costly as the man-
ager discounts the future. This tradeoff changes in case banks can anticipate a bailout if
they fail.
In fact, banks are more likely to receive a bailout than non-financial firms. Smith (2014)
constructs a dataset of financially distressed firms across industries and countries, and
identifies that the likelihood of receiving a bailout strongly increases in firm size and
when the firm is active in the financial sector. In addition, DeYoung et al. (2013)
measure with respect to risk-taking that banks exploit their too-big-to-fail incentives and
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therefore set incentives in a way that managers increase risk taking. In our model, we
analyze how a bailout affects the composition of managerial compensation and the time-
horizon of investments. By bailing out a bank that is too-big-to-fail, the government
averts further damage from the economy and the financial system. At the same time,
this policy can be anticipated by banks of a certain size. If banks know that their
imminent bankruptcy prompts the government to act, they may adjust their incentive
structures already beforehand. Our findings demonstrate that banks indeed change their
compensation structure towards higher short-term payments in most cases. This action
does not only increase the likelihood of harmful short-termist behavior in general. It is
also accompanied by a further increase in existing, already excessive short-termism.
However, in a third step, we show how the specific taxation of short-term bonuses can
reverse the negative effects a bailout entails for short-termism and compensation. In the
midst of the financial crisis, several countries introduced a tax on managerial bonuses to
raise tax revenue and to appease the public.71 While the UK imposed a 50% tax on cash
bonuses for all bankers, other countries made their bonus tax contingent on governmental
aid.72 To this effect, Ireland introduced a 90% bonus tax in 2011, and the US House of
Representatives in 2009 voted for a 90% bonus tax for banks under the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP).73
Combining the possibility of short-termism with a bailout, this chapter shows how a
bailout guarantee by governments changes equilibrium compensation and short-termist
behavior. Harmful short-termism is more likely to occur or even increases in the presence
of a bailout. In most cases, a bailout makes it profitable for a bank to change its compen-
sation structure towards higher short-term payments, tolerating the negative consequence
of short-termism. Moreover, the chapter explains the observation that the financial sector
pays higher short-term bonuses than other sectors.74 It shows that one reason for this
could be the systemic externality of banks. However, for a government that anticipates
these negative consequences, the chapter provides an argument for a tax on short-term
compensation. This leads the banks to internalize the costs of short-termism and sets
incentives to reduce short-term bonuses and short-termism.
71See Shackelford et al. (2010), Keen (2011a) and Devereux (2011) for other proposals regarding the
regulation of the financial sector.
72Under the UK Finance Act 2010 (Schedule 1), the so called UK bank payroll tax for the fiscal year
2009-2010 was levied on bonus payments higher than GBP 25.000.
73See “Ireland to reintroduce 90% bank bonus tax” (guardian.co.uk 2011, Jan 26) and “Bonus Tax Heads
to Senate After House Passes 90% Levy” (bloomberg.com 2009, Mar 20).
74See Von Ehrlich and Radulescu (2012).
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3.2. Related Literature
In order to model the effects of bailouts and bonus taxation on executive compensation
and short-termism, we draw on the literature of optimal contracting or agency theory. In
the presence of an information asymmetry, firms need some kind of incentive instrument
in order to align the manager’s interests with their own interests (Jensen and Meckling
1976, Holmstrom 1979, and Grossman and Hart 1983, among others).75 Adding multiple
periods to the analysis, the literature on short-term and long-term compensation extends
the standard agency theory by targeting the issue of the time-horizon of the managers’
investment decisions. Starting with works by Narayanan (1985), Stein (1989) and Von
Thadden (1995), the literature has shown that managers may inflate current profits to
raise their own reputation (Narayanan, 1985), to polish the forecast of future firm value
(Stein, 1989), or to reduce the likelihood of project termination (Von Thadden, 1995).76
Even though harmful for the firm, optimal executive compensation is found to emphasize
short-termism when stock markets are speculative (Bolton et al., 2006) or when infor-
mation about short-term performance is very noisy (Peng and Röell, 2014). In addition
to internal reasons to accept short-termism, Thanassoulis (2013) presents an externality
that leads to short-termism and an optimal contract tolerating it. Within a competitive
labor market for managers, he finds that firms exert a negative externality towards each
other in driving up managers’ outside options. Under certain conditions, industry may
partition such that large firms pay high short-term bonuses and tolerate short-termism,
while smaller firms use compensation methods that prevent short-termism.
In terms of methodology, this chapter is particularly related to Thanassoulis (2013) whom
we follow with respect to the managers business decisions and the instruments for execu-
tive compensation. However, we depart from Thanassoulis (2013) in omitting the compet-
itive labor market and in simplifying the assumption of the manager’s effort costs. While
Thanassoulis (2013) suggests effort costs for the manager to depend on his income (à la
Edmans et al., 2009), we use a linear functional form with fixed exogenous effort costs
75While in this literature a manager finds himself within a competitive market for employees that drives
down compensation payments, the managerial power approach sees managers to be powerful in the
wage-setting process and able to extract rents (Bebchuk et al. 2002, Bebchuk and Fried 2003 and
Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Glazer and Konrad (1999) and Rothschild and Scheuer (2011) analyze
the taxation of rent-seeking activities, while Frydman and Jenter (2010) and Murphy (2013) provide
overviews for contributions both within the managerial power approach and the efficient contracting
literature.
76In contrast to the view of inefficient short-termism, Laux (2012) suggests a beneficial effect of short-
term investments: When managers can be replaced, such investment allows an early assessment of
the manager’s fit to the firm and thus a more efficient replacement process.
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independent of income as commonly used in literature.77 Keeping the manager’s outside
option exogenous allows us to focus in a simple model on the effects we want to study:
the effects of bailouts and a bonus tax on executive compensation and short-termism.
Therefore we allow the manager to have a continuous choice of short-termism rather
than only a binary one as in Thanassoulis (2013). In addition, we extend Thanassoulis’
work by adding the possibility of a bailout and a bonus tax.
Literature has already dealt with the effects of a bailout on managerial compensation
and its effects on risk-taking for a one-period case. Both Besley and Ghatak (2013)
and Hakenes and Schnabel (2014) analyze how bonuses change when bailouts can be
anticipated by systemic banks and both show that risk-taking increases in the anticipation
of a bailout. The same result has been shown by Hilmer (2014b), who, in contrast to
Besley and Ghatak (2013) and Hakenes and Schnabel (2014), focused on collective moral
hazard when banks receive bailouts only if they fail together. All these papers make clear
that banks that can anticipate a bailout are likely to change their incentive payments in
such a way that risk-taking is encouraged while social costs are neglected. However, they
only present results for a single period and ignore longer lasting compensation components
as observed in reality. With this chapter, we fill this gap and offer insights into the effects
of a bailout on the intertemporal composition of executive pay like cash bonuses and
stock options. Moreover, our two-period principal-agent model allows us to study a so
far unconsidered element in the literature: the effects of a bailout on managerial short-
termism rather than risk-taking.
Besides the effects of a bailout, this chapter deals with the effects of a tax on short-term
bonus payments. In this respect, our work is related to the literature on bonus taxation.78
Part of this literature analyzes the effects of a bonus tax on compensation payments and
effort incentives. Both Dietl et al. (2013) and Hilmer (2013) find that effort decreases
in the bonus tax while bonus payments to the manager might increase or decrease.79
In addition, Hilmer (2013) identifies effects to be similar for a bonus tax and a limited
deductibility of bonus payments from the corporate income tax and highlights the positive
welfare effects of a subsidy for bonus payments. Grossmann et al. (2012), Besley and
Ghatak (2013) and Hilmer (2014b) study the effects of a bonus tax on risk-taking. While
77See, e.g. Laffont and Martimort (2002).
78In addition, this chapter is related to the literature on taxation of risk-taking activities. See Buchholz
and Konrad (2014) for a recent survey on this topic.
79Von Ehrlich and Radulescu (2012) estimate the effects of the UK bank payroll tax and find a reduction
in bonuses of 40% caused by the tax. However, banks one-to-one increased other pay components
not subject to the tax.
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the findings by Grossmann et al. (2012) imply risk-taking to be increasing in a bonus tax
for a risk-averse manager, Besley and Ghatak (2013) and Hilmer (2014b) find the opposite
effect for a risk-neutral manager in the presence of a bailout. Both of them emphasize
the positive effects of a bonus tax that leads banks to internalize part of the social costs
a bailout entails, also when the bonus tax is introduced unilaterally (Hilmer, 2014b).80
Even though Besley and Ghatak (2013) and Hilmer (2014b) examine the effects of both
a bailout and bonus taxation in their frameworks, this is the first model that addresses
the optimal taxation of bonus pay in a setting that includes short-term and long-term
incentive payments in its analysis. This allows us to introduce potential short-termism
and to generate new insights with respect to the effects of bailouts and bonus taxes on
the composition of incentive pay between periods and managerial short-termism.
In the following section, we introduce the model and derive the equilibrium compensation
contracts and the resulting levels of short-termism. In Section 3.4, the effects of a gov-
ernmental bailout on managerial compensation and short-termism are analyzed, while
Section 3.5 then illustrates how a bonus tax reverses the negative incentives a bailout
entails. Section 1.5 concludes.
3.3. The Model
3.3.1. Banks, Managers and Business Decisions
Consider a situation with a risk-neutral bank-shareholder (principal) who delegates the
task of running its operations to a risk-neutral bank-manager (agent). In t = 0, the
bank offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the manager, whose payoff is subject to a
limited liability constraint and who has an exogenous outside option u ≥ 0 and zero
initial wealth. If the manager accepts the contract, he makes a business decision at the
beginning of period t = 1 about an investment that contains an effort choice e ∈ {0, 1}
and a degree of short-termist behavior a ≥ 0. Depending on his business decision, the
investment generates returns both at the end of period t = 1 and at the end of t = 2.
80Thanassoulis (2012) and Radulescu (2012) emphasize the role of the managers’ outside option. When
competition for bankers entails a negative externality to other banks, Thanassoulis (2012) finds no
effects of bonus taxes on the default risk that excessive bonuses cause. According to Radulescu (2012),
also a manager with relocation possibilities reduces effort when faced with a bonus tax, but may earn
a higher bonus when his risk aversion is high enough.
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Profit at t = 1 Profit at t = 2
Manager exerts effort (& short-termism)
{
πH with prob. x+ a
πL with prob. 1− (x+ a)
{
πH with prob. x− δa
πL with prob. 1− (x− δa)
Manager exerts zero effort πL πL
Table 3.1.: Project returns with and without short-termism
Business Decisions The realization of firm profit is independent across periods and can
take one of two values in each period: high profit πH or low profit πL (with πH > πL ≥ 0).
If the manager does not exert effort, then the investment will fail for sure and low profit
πL will be realized in both periods (see Table 3.1). By exerting effort e = 1, the manager
increases the probability of the high profit πH . In this case, profit πH will be realized
with probability x in each period. In addition to effort, the manager may take a short-
termist action a. Following Thanassoulis (2013), we model short-termism as increasing
the probability of high short-term profit at the expense of the probability of high long-
term profit.81 By focusing on short-term results, i.e. choosing a > 0, profit in period
t = 1 will be πH with probability x+a rather than x (and πL with probability 1−(x+ a)).
However, in period t = 2, the probability for the high profit πH will only be x−δa instead
of x for the case without short-termism. By assuming δ > 1, action a > 0 not only shifts
probability mass for the high profit πH from period t = 2 to period t = 1. Moreover,
δ > 1 ensures that the model captures short-termism for the bank, i.e. any short-termist
action a 6= 0 is harmful for the bank and, in addition, socially undesirable. In that sense,
δ denotes the bank’s cost of the short-termist action that arises as the manager increases
short-term results at the expense of long-term results.82
Both effort and short-termism are assumed to be costly for the manager. While high
effort comes at a fixed nonmonetary investment cost I > 0 (and zero costs if the manager
81Our concept of modeling short-termism holds for several real-world interpretations of short-termism.
Examples are unfavorable and unobservable borrowing against future earnings (Stein, 1989), excessive
exposure to derivatives (as futures or swaps) that provide no additional long-term value (Foster and
Young, 2010) or lax lending standards to inflate the balance sheet (Shin, 2009). Nevertheless, our
agent is fully rational. In that respect we differ from the behavioral literature on myopic loss aversion
(Benartzi and Thaler 1995, Thaler et al. 1997, among others).
82By interpreting the short-termist action a as degree of earnings manipulation, this model is also
related to the literature of costly state falsification (see Crocker and Slemrod 2007 or Laux 2014,
among others). In Laux (2014), the agent can manipulate the financial report (at a cost) on which
the principal bases his decision about continuing or terminating a certain project (corresponds to
a > 0). As a result of manipulation, the principal may then not terminate an unprofitable project
and destroy long-term value (corresponds to δ > 1).
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chooses e = 0), costs of the short-termist action are assumed to be quadratic, i.e. C (a) =
k
2a
2, with k > 0.83 In order to focus on the incentive effects of a bailout and/or a bonus
tax on short-termism, we assume that it is always profitable for the bank to offer a
contract to the manager that induces high effort.84
We model moral hazard in that the choice of effort (e = 0 or e = 1) and short-termism
(a ≥ 0) is private information to the manager and not observable by the bank. To
guarantee that the manager’s effort choice cannot be traced back by the bank, we assume
that the probability of any outcome is strictly between zero and one, i.e. 0 < x − aδ ≤
x ≤ x + a < 1. Ex post, realized profits in period t = 1 and t = 2 are observable and
verifiable.
Compensation Payments Managers are assumed to receive profit-contingent compen-
sation with three possible payment instruments used by the bank. At the end of period
t = 1, the manager may receive a fixed wage A ≥ 0 and a short-term bonus bs ≥ 0. While
the fixed wage is paid independent of realized returns in any period, the short-term bonus
bs is paid only if the realized profit in t = 1 is πH . In the long run, at the end of period
t = 2, the manager may receive vested or deferred pay (i.e. a long-term bonus compo-
nent) bl ≥ 0 if the realized profit in t = 2 is πH .85 Both the bank and the manager are
assumed to discount future. While the bank discounts at rate r ≥ 0, the manager has a
83This convex characterization implies that costs for the short-termist action are small in the beginning
but increase in the level of short-termism. As short-termism is not in the bank’s interest, the manager
might need to camouflage short-termism, or, as in Laux (2014), better manipulation may be more
expensive.
84This implies an implicit assumption on effort costs I and the outside option u. In particular, for e = 1
being more profitable than e = 0 for all possible a, effort costs I have to be sufficiently small such
that (2x+ ā− δā) (πH − πL) − x+a1−tb [I + C (ā)] ≡ Ω > 0, with ā =
1
k
(√
2kI + k2x2 − kx
)
. In order
that the principal obtains non-negative equilibrium profits, Ω + 2πL − u ≥ 0 must hold in addition.
Consequently, an equilibrium in which the bank incentivizes effort e = 0 does not exist. In particular,
there cannot be an equilibrium with e = 0 and a > 0. For e = 0, the manager has no advantage from
a > 0 (as for example increasing the probability of a certain outcome), but incurs costs C (a).
85For the bonus payment bl, the principal could also use the information he gained meanwhile. Making bl
next to profit in t = 2 also conditional on past profit realization in t = 1 alters the manager’s marginal
analysis. Nevertheless, the qualitative effects with respect to the bailout and bonus taxation do not
change. We therefore follow the literature (e.g. Thanassoulis, 2013) and stick to this simpler contract
structure with deferred payments being conditional only on current profit realization. While to our
knowledge there is no literature on the optimal contract with the specification used here, there exist
papers (Lambert 1983, Rogerson 1985, Edmans et al. 2012) showing that optimal contracts exhibit
memory of past outcomes when the agent chooses effort in each period. Particularly with regard to
short-termism, Edmans et al. (2012) present closed-form solutions in a model with risk-aversion and
private saving. Still, also their complex optimal contract of a rebalanced account contains deferred
pay.
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discount rate ρ ≥ r.86 Thus, at the end of t = 1, the manager’s net present value (NPV)
of the long-term bonus bl is bl1+ρ .
3.3.2. First-Best and Welfare Maximum
Before we turn to the principal-agent problem with information asymmetry between bank
and manager, we first identify the first-best solution and solve for the welfare maximum.
As the bank can observe the manager’s effort choice and the level of short-termist action,
it will maximize payoff by directly contracting upon the manager’s choice variables. Total
compensation must cover the manager’s outside option u and his costs for effort, I, and
for the short-termist action, k2a
2. Dependent on the manager’s discount rate, the bank
will prefer compensation payments in period t = 1 weakly (with strict preference if
ρ > r) to paying a long-term bonus that may be less valued by the manager. Taking the
necessary compensation u+ I+ k2a
2 into account and given our assumption that inducing
effort e = 1 is always profitable, the principal maximizes expected payoff E (UP ) =
(x+ a) (πH − bs) + (1− x− a)πL −A+ (x− δa)
(
πH−bl
1+r
)
+ (1− x+ δa) πL1+r by choosing
short-termist action a.
For the welfare analysis, we assume that a benevolent social planner maximizes overall
efficiency and define welfare as the sum of manager’s expected payoff E (UA) = A +
(x+ a) bs+(x− δa) bl1+ρ−I−C (a) and the bank’s expected payoff E (UP ) in the absence of
any externality.87 As both bank and manager are risk neutral, all wage payments except bl
have only distributional impacts and do not affect welfare.88 Expected welfare is therefore
given by E (W ) = (x+ a) πH+(1− x− a) πL+(x− δa) πH1+r +(1− x+ δa)
πL
1+r−I−C (a).
Lemma 3.1. In first-best, short-termism is chosen welfare maximizing according to
aFB = max
{
0, πH − πL
k
(
1− δ1 + r
)}
.
86As will be discussed later (p. 61), there are good arguments to allow for ρ > r. Managers not only
resist high long-term payments because of their desire for portfolio diversification or liquidity concerns
(Walker, 2010). But also, the uncertainty of long-term payments and the unpredictability of personal
events may make short-term compensation more favorable for managers. We will later discuss the
implications of ρ = r or ρ > r when analyzing the equilibrium.
87As we will later introduce a bailout and a bonus tax, both would affect E (UP ). However, in our
optimal welfare function that maximizes efficiency we abstract from those effects as they only have
distributional impacts.
88Due to our assumption ρ ≥ r, bl negatively affects welfare and therefore will not be used by the social
planner.
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Proof. All proofs are contained in appendix B.
Lemma 3.1 is intuitive. Suppose the bank does not discount future, i.e. r = 0. As
short-termism is harmful for the bank, i.e. δ > 0, short-termism is inefficient both from
the bank’s perspective and from a welfare perspective. Therefore, it should be avoided
and both the bank in first-best as well as the social planner always want to have the
short-termist action a = 0. However, if the bank discounts period t = 2 profits more than
short-termism harms expected payoffs, i.e. 1 + r > δ, then, short-termism is actually
beneficial. By paying the manager to focus on short-term results, probability mass is
shifted from the highly discounted and therefore less valuable period t = 2 profits to
undiscounted period t = 1 profits.89 In the following, we will focus on cases where
short-termism is inefficient and unprofitable. That is, we assume 1 + r ≤ δ.
3.3.3. Second-Best without Bailouts
In presence of the agency problem, the manager and the bank will choose actions that
maximize their expected income and their expected profit, respectively. We solve the
model by backward induction and start with the manager’s maximization problem, fol-
lowed by the bank’s optimization.
The manager chooses effort e and the short-termist action a so as to maximize his expected
payoff E (UA). Provided that e = 1, this defines the optimal amount of short-termism
a∗ = argmax
a
A+ (x+ a) bs + (x− δa)
bl
1 + ρ − I −
k
2a
2,
which, in combination with the restricted domain a ≥ 0, denotes the manager’s first order
condition:90
a∗ = max
{
0, 1
k
(
bs − δ
bl
1 + ρ
)}
(3.1)
When offering a contract to the manager, the bank considers the manager’s optimal-
ity condition (3.1) and maximizes expected profit E (UP ) by choosing the conditionally
89As 1 + r > δ, the benefits of this shift outweigh the inefficiency of short-termism in general.
90Note that the second order condition for a maximum w.r.t. a is satisfied.
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optimal compensation components A, bs and bl:
max
A,bs,bl
exp. short−term profit︷ ︸︸ ︷
(x+ a) (πH − bs) + (1− x− a) πL +
+
NPV of exp. long−term profit︷ ︸︸ ︷( 1
1 + r
)
[(x− δa) (πH − bl) + (1− x+ δa)πL]−
fixed wage︷︸︸︷
A (3.2)
s.t. (3.1)
A+ (x+ a) bs + (x− δa) bl1+ρ − I −
k
2a
2 ≥ u (3.3)
(x+ a) bs + (x− δa) bl1+ρ − I −
k
2a
2 ≥ 0 (3.4)
Equation (3.3) is the manager’s participation constraint that has to be fulfilled in order
for him to accept the bank’s contract offer. Expected income in t = 1 units must remu-
nerate the manager at least for his outside option u and his costs for effort and identifying
projects with a high probability of short-term profits. Moreover, the bank has to incen-
tivize the manager to exert effort e = 1. Condition (3.4) makes sure that the manager
does not shirk with respect to effort. Finally, as explained above, the manager will choose
short-termism according to (3.1). The bank has to take into account the three constraints
above together with the non-negativity constraint on compensation payments.
Equilibrium In order to incentivize high effort, the bank must either pay a short-term
bonus bs and/or a long-term bonus bl to the manager (see (3.4)). For the bank, this
creates a tradeoff between two different effects that short-term and long-term bonuses
induce.
Lemma 3.2. For a > 0, there are two opposing effects with respect to effort inducing
bonus payments. (i) The level of short-termism is declining in the level of long-term bonus
pay. (ii) Compensation costs increase in the use of the long-term bonus if ρ > r; the cost
increase is stronger, the larger ρ is compared to r.
On the one hand, the bank prefers paying a long-term bonus to the manager to induce
high effort as compared to paying a short-term bonus. In contrast to a short-term bonus,
a long-term bonus better targets sustainable bank profit in the short and in the long run,
and thus better aligns the bank’s and the manager’s interests. Suppose, for example, the
bank concentrates on paying only a long-term bonus to induce high effort. In this case,
interests between the bank and the manager are perfectly aligned. While short-termism
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is always harmful for the bank by assumption δ > 1 + r, paying only long-term bonuses
makes short-termism also unprofitable for the manager. Any level of short-termism a 6= 0
causes not only costs C (a) > 0 for the manager, but also reduces the probability of a
high period t = 2 profit and thus the probability of receiving the bonus bl.
On the other hand, a long-term bonus increases the bank’s compensation costs weakly
more than a short-term bonus. As the manager discounts the long-term bonus necessary
to incentivize effort at rate ρ ≥ 0, long-term bonus payments are only worth bl1+ρ for the
manager, in contrast to a short-term bonus that is worth bs. As long as the bank’s and
the manager’s discount rates differ, ρ > r, the difference in the manager’s valuation of
short-term and long-term bonuses also creates a difference in the bank’s compensation
costs.
This wedge in the bank’s compensation costs scales down the closer the two discount
rates are to each other. In the special case where the discount rates are just the same,
i.e. ρ = r, the bank discounts future profits and payments just as much as the manager
does. In this case, the second effect stated in Lemma 3.2 disappears, and short-term
and long-term bonuses become just equally expensive for the bank. As, by assumption
1 + r ≤ δ, short-termism is unprofitable for the bank, the bank will indeed pay effort
incentives in such a way that it prevents short-termism. According to (3.1), this is the
case whenever bs ≤ δbl1+ρ .
Lemma 3.3. Suppose the discount rates of the bank and the manager coincide, i.e. ρ = r.
Then, it is optimal for the bank to prevent short-termism, i.e. a = 0 by means of com-
pensation payments. Both bank and manager are indifferent between any compensation
structure that pays a fixed wage A = u and bonuses bs ≤ δbl1+ρ and bl = (1 + ρ)
(
I
x
− bs
)
.
In contrast to coinciding discount rates, empirical evidence both from natural and field
experiments (Warner and Pleeter 2001, Harrison et al. 2002) suggests individuals’ dis-
count rates to be far above the risk-free borrowing rates of firms. As is standard in the
literature on dynamic models of the principal-agent relationship, we will assume in the
following that the agent’s discount rate exceeds the market-interest rate that the princi-
pal faces (DeMarzo and Sannikov 2006, De Marzo and Fishman 2007, Biais et al. 2007,
Biais et al. 2010). This makes the manager more impatient than the bank and generates
incentives for the bank to pay short-term bonuses as well as long-term bonuses.91 For
91Although Lemma 3.3 states that short-term bonuses bs > 0 are an equilibrium, those equilibria would
be eliminated whenever costs for short-term bonuses increase (e.g. by charging a tax on short-term
bonuses).
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the sake of convenience, we follow Thanassoulis (2013) and normalize the bank’s discount
rate to zero and thus continue with the assumption ρ > r = 0.92
There are two possible situations for the short-termist action a: either the manager does
not search for projects with a high likelihood of short-term profits (a = 0), or he does
(a > 0). Let us first analyze the conditions under which short-termism will be ruled out
and continue by identifying the conditions under which short-termism takes place.
Proposition 3.1. When the manager’s discount rate is low, ρ ≤ ρ ≡ (πH−πL)(δ−1)(1+δ)δI
x
+xk ,
then the manager is incentivized such that he avoids short-termism (a = 0). As compen-
sation, the manager receives a fixed wage A = u, a short-term bonus bs = δI(1+δ)x and a
long-term bonus bl = (1+ρ)I(1+δ)x .
According to Lemma 3.2, the use of long-term bonuses will reduce short-termism but
at the same time increase compensation costs. For the bank, this tradeoff is not too
severe if the manager’s discount rate is low. Whenever ρ ≤ ρ, effect (i) of Lemma 3.2
impacts bank profits stronger than effect (ii) of the same lemma: The benefit of the
long-term bonus in avoiding short-termism is larger than the additional costs for the
long-term bonus that arise because of its discounted value. Overall, the bank is better off
if it incentivizes the manager in such a way that he exerts high effort, but totally avoids
short-termism. In addition, effort incentives are induced by a combination of long-term
and short-term bonus. Consider (3.1) that states the manager’s optimal level of short-
termism. In order that a = 0 can be an equilibrium, bs ≤ δ bl1+ρ must hold. Nevertheless,
bs < δ
bl
1+ρ cannot be an equilibrium outcome for the bank. By increasing the short-term
bonus and simultaneously decreasing the, since discounted, more expensive long-term
bonus, the bank could still induce effort and avoid short-termism. Beyond that, this
action would reduce total compensation costs and increase bank profit. Therefore, both
short-term and long-term bonus will be chosen such that both the manager’s incentive
constraint with respect to effort (3.4) as well as his first order condition with respect to
short-termism (3.1) are binding. Finally, the fixed wage A is independent of the manager’s
choice of effort and short-termism and perfectly covers his reservation wage to make the
participation constraint (3.3) binding at the optimum.
While Proposition 3.1 shows under which circumstances, especially ρ ≤ ρ, short-termism
can be ruled out, it can also be in the bank’s interest to allow for short-termist behavior.
92Note that the assumption ρ > r influences equilibrium formation. Nevertheless, as will be shown
later, comparative statics results regarding bailout and bonus tax are not qualitatively driven by the
difference in discount rates, given that those equilibria emerge.
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Consider again (3.1). According to this condition, bs > δ bl1+ρ is necessary in order that
the manager chooses a = 1
k
(
bs − δ bl1+ρ
)
> 0. It is easy to see, that for bs > δ bl1+ρ the level
of short-termism is increasing in the level of short-term bonus bs and decreasing in the
level of long-term compensation bl. Thus, as short-termism is unprofitable for the bank,
the cost effect of the long-term bonus described in part (ii) of Lemma 3.2 must outweigh
the short-termism avoiding effect denoted in part (i) of the same Lemma so that the bank
is willing to accept a > 0. Depending on the degree of the manager’s impatience, two
equilibria exist:
Proposition 3.2. When the manager’s discount rate is high, ρ ≥ ρ̄ ≡ (πH−πL)(δ−1)+āk(x+ā)k
x(1+δ)
(x−δā) ,
then the bank tolerates a high level of short-termism with a = ā ≡ 1
k
(√
2kI + k2x2 − kx
)
>
0. As compensation, the manager receives a fixed wage A = u and a short-term bonus
bs =
√
2kI + k2x2 − kx. The bank abstains from paying a long-term bonus, i.e. bl = 0.
There exists a threshold for the manager’s discount rate ρ̄ above which the bank will fully
focus on a short-term bonus to incentivize effort. For ρ > ρ̄, the manager discounts the
long-term payment bl so strongly, that its use to incentivize effort is more costly for the
bank than accepting short-termist behavior by the manager. Moreover, it is even cheaper
to tolerate a very high degree of short-termism, i.e. a = ā, than reducing short-termism
below ā by substituting at least some short-term bonus with long-term pay bl.
This latter finding changes when the discount rate ρ decreases. Then, the cost effect of
the long-term bonus denoted in part (ii) of Lemma 3.2 weakens while the positive effect
of bl on reducing short-termism stays unchanged. Whenever the discount rate belongs
to the medium range ρ < ρ < ρ̄, reducing the manager’s incentives for short-termism
becomes profitable:
Proposition 3.3. When the manager’s discount rate is in a medium range, ρ < ρ < ρ̄,
then the bank tolerates some degree of short-termism a ∈ (0, ā). Optimal short-termism
is implicitly defined by
− (πH − πL) (δ − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
−
akx+ δI − δ k2a
2
(1 + δ)x︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+δ
I − akx− k2a
2
(1 + δ)x (1 + ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
+(x+ a) (x− δa) k
x (1 + δ) ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(D)
= 0
(3.5)
and increasing in the discount rate ρ. As compensation, the manager receives a fixed wage
A = u, a short-term bonus bs =
akx+δI−δ k2 a
2
(1+δ)x and a long-term bonus bl =
I−akx− k2 a
2
(1+δ)x (1 + ρ).
Both in Proposition 3.2 and Proposition 3.3, the bank wishes to prevent any short-
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termist behavior by the manager, but has to cope with the manager’s impatience. While
for ρ ≥ ρ̄ long-term bonus payments that could reduce short-termism below a = ā are
not profitable for the bank, it is profitable for the bank to tolerate only some degree of
short-termism a < ā and to avoid higher short-termism by paying a long-term bonus
bl > 0 if ρ < ρ < ρ̄. Thereby, the bank equalizes the marginal costs an increase in short-
termism would cause on expected profits (A) and on expected short-term payments (B)
with the marginal benefits it would create. On the one hand the likelihood that the
bank has to pay the long-term bonus decreases (C), on the other hand the bank can save
compensation costs for the marginal unit short-termism when paying a short-term bonus
rather than a discounted long-term bonus (D).
The costs of preventing short-termism are increasing in the discount rate ρ, and so is
short-termism until ρ = ρ̄ and a = ā. Beyond that point, a more short-termist behavior
is not profitable anymore for the manager. For a = ā, marginal costs of the short-termist
action ka just equal the marginal benefit of receiving the short-term bonus bs with higher
probability. For a > ā, the manager’s marginal costs further increase by parameter k,
while the incentive payment bs is independent of the manager’s impatience and short-
termism. Therefore, short-termism a > ā does not pay off for the manager, independent
of his impatience.
Figure 3.1 shows the different equilibria that emerge depending on the manager’s discount
rate ρ. Going from the left to the right, the figure displays the following: If the manager
discounts future income relatively little, i.e. ρ ≤ ρ, the bank will pay both a bonus in
period t = 1 and a bonus in period t = 2 in case of success. Nevertheless, it will not
tolerate any degree of short-termism other than a = 0. This changes if the manager is
more impatient, i.e. ρ < ρ < ρ̄. Then, the bank will still pay both short-term and long-
term bonuses, but is willing to tolerate some short-termist behavior a > 0. The more
the manager discounts the future, the more the bank will focus on the short-term bonus
rather than long-term payments, leading to a higher degree of short-termism. Finally,
if the manager’s impatience is very high, i.e. ρ ≥ ρ̄, then the bank fully stops paying
long-term compensation and tolerates a high degree of harmful short-termism a = ā in
its investments.
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Figure 3.1.: Short-termism a as a function of discount rate ρ with threshold levels in
the absence of bailout and bonus tax (ρ and ρ̄), in the presence of a bailout (ρβ and
ρ̄β) and in the presence of both bailout and bonus tax (ρt and ρ̄t).
3.4. Effects of a Bailout
Having specified the possible equilibria, we can now turn to the implications of a bailout.
Following Besley and Ghatak (2013) for the case of a bailout, we will extend possible
returns by introducing a bailout payment β, with πH > β > πL. Whenever profit
realization is πL, the bank would not be able to survive on its own and would harm
the economy with its bankruptcy. In order to avoid negative contagion effects caused
by a bank that is too-big-to-fail, the government pays a bailout β if the bank was not
successful. For simplification, we normalize πL = 0, and define β as the difference between
the return in case of a public bailout and the return in case of failure.
The anticipation of a bailout ceteris paribus increases the bank’s profit in case of failure
and therewith total expected payoff. Simultaneously, it also changes the bank’s maxi-
mization problem from (3.2) to
max
A,bs,bl
(x+ a) (πH − bs)+(1− x− a) β+[(x− δa) (πH − bl) + (1− x+ δa) β]−A, (3.6)
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while the constraints (3.1), (3.3) and (3.4) with respect to the manager’s incentives do
not alter. As a bailout has the same effects as an increase in πL, one can immediately
see by looking at Propositions 3.1 - 3.3 that a possible bailout does not directly affect
compensation payments in any of the given equilibria. Rather, it affects the thresholds
ρ and ρ̄ that determine the actual equilibrium and the bank’s profit denoted by (3.2).
Receiving a bailout β > πL reduces the bank’s downside and thus its costs of the short-
termist action a. Although any short-termist behavior a 6= 0 still is harmful for the bank,
the expected loss attributed to this action decreases as β increases. As a consequence,
the bank’s tradeoff between creating sustainable bank profit by paying long-term bonuses
and reducing compensation costs by paying short-term bonuses changes:
Proposition 3.4. Suppose the government pays a bailout β > πL. This bailout leads to
thresholds ρβ and ρ̄β that separate equilibria, with ρβ < ρ and ρ̄β < ρ̄. It
1. induces an increase in short-term bonuses, a decrease in long-term compensation, and
higher levels of short-termism if ρ ∈
(
ρβ, ρ̄
)
,
2. and, has neither an effect on compensation payments nor on short-termism if ρ ≤ ρβ
or ρ ≥ ρ̄.
If a bank can reckon with a governmental bailout in case of a bad outcome, it changes
its contract offers to managers and thereby compensation composition and incentives.
By receiving a bailout β > πL, the bank’s costs of the manager’s short-termist behavior
decrease as the bank in case of failure does not loose πH − πL anymore in comparison to
success, but only πH−β. This leads to changes both with respect to equilibrium selection
(extensive margin) as well as with respect to choices for a given equilibrium (intensive
margin) as shown in Figure 3.1.
On the extensive margin, the thresholds for the manager’s impatience that determine
equilibria decline from ρ to ρβ and ρ̄ to ρ̄β. This decline in thresholds leads to a situation
where the two equilibria with short-termism a > 0 (denoted in Propositions 3.2 and 3.3)
are more likely to occur, i.e. in addition to ρ > ρ also for ρ ∈
(
ρβ, ρ
)
. Especially, the
equilibrium with very high harmful short-termism a = ā (Proposition 3.2) is more likely
to occur, i.e. the range increases by ρ ∈
(
ρ̄β, ρ̄
)
. In addition to higher short-termism, this
shift in the equilibrium for those ranges of ρ leads to an increase in short-term bonuses,
e.g. for ρ ∈
(
ρβ, ρ
)
from bs = δI(1+δ)x to bs =
akx+δI−δ k2 a
2
(1+δ)x , and to a reduction in long-term
bonuses, e.g. for ρ ∈
(
ρ̄β, ρ̄
)
from bl =
I−akx− k2 a
2
(1+δ)x (1 + ρ) to bl = 0. In the absence of a
bailout, it is not profitable for the bank to tolerate (high) short-termism for these ranges
of ρ. In the presence of a bailout in case of failure, this changes. The bank is willing to
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tolerate (higher) short-termism in order to save compensation costs that arise due to the
manager’s impatience. Thereby, it fully neglects the negative external effects it imposes
on the government that pays the bailout.
On the intensive margin, similar effects on the composition of incentive pay and tolerated
short-termism can be observed for discount rates ρ ∈
(
ρ, ρ̄β
)
. For this range, both
without and with a bailout the equilibrium denoted in Proposition 3.3 applies. Again,
the bank equalizes marginal benefits and marginal costs of an increase of short-termism.
However, the only change to (3.5) arises in the marginal costs an increase in short-termism
would cause on expected profits (A) for which the absolute value decreases for β > πL.
Consequently, comparative statics on (3.5) show that the bank tolerates higher levels of
harmful and inefficient short-termism for β > πL and that it changes incentive payments.
It reduces compensation costs by lowering the long-term bonus, while it increases the
short-term bonus to maintain effort incentives. That this action alters the manager’s
short-termist behavior is neglected by the bank as the government carries over part of
the possible loss via the bailout.
However, if ρ is small or large enough, i.e. ρ ≤ ρβ or ρ ≥ ρ̄, the according equilibrium
denoted either in Proposition 3.1 or 3.2 does not change for this particular discount rate.
Short-termism stays either zero (for ρ ≤ ρβ ) or a = ā (for ρ ≥ ρ̄). In both cases neither
compensation payments nor short-termism change as the tradeoff for the bank stays the
same. For ρ ≤ ρβ, the benefit from the bailout is still lower than the remaining costs
that short-termism entails. Therefore, it is still more profitable for the bank to give effort
incentives via a high long-term bonus while preventing the yet harmful short-termism.
In case that ρ ≥ ρ̄, the manager’s discount rate is just too high for it could become
profitable to reduce short-termism by paying a long-term bonus. As the cost structure of
the short-termist action does not change, short-termism stays unchanged.
Overall, a bailout may or may not affect incentive payments and short-termism. While a
bailout does not influence payments and short-termism for very high or very low discount
rates, it distorts incentive payments towards short-term bonuses and increases short-
termism for a large range of discount rates. Moreover, a bailout makes it more likely
in general that the bank focuses on short-term bonuses rather than giving incentives by
long-term payments to its manager and that it tolerates inefficiently high short-termism.
67
Bailouts, Bonuses and Bankers’ Short-Termism
3.5. Effects of a Bonus Tax
Anticipating the negative external effects a bailout imposes on short-termism in banking,
the government in t = 0 may introduce a bonus tax tb ∈ [0, 1) on short-term bonuses. At
first sight, a bonus tax which is imposed on the manager’s short-term bonus and which
has to be paid by the manager does not hit the bank as the bank’s maximization problem
(3.6) does not change. Nevertheless, implicitly it also affects the bank as it impacts the
constraints the bank faces. The manager only cares about his net-compensation consisting
of the fixed wage A, the short-term bonus net of taxes (1− tb) bs and the long-term bonus
bl. This changes the manager’s participation constraint from (3.3) to (3.7), his incentives
towards exerting effort from (3.4) to (3.8), and the first order condition of undertaking
short-termism from (3.1) to (3.9), respectively.
A+ (x+ a) (1− tb) bs + (x− δa) bl1+ρ − I −
k
2a
2 ≥ u (3.7)
(x+ a) (1− tb) bs + (x− δa) bl1+ρ − I −
k
2a
2 ≥ 0 (3.8)
a∗ = max
{
0, 1
k
[
(1− tb) bs − δ bl1+ρ
]}
(3.9)
For given compensation payments, a bonus tax lowers the manager’s net compensation
and will make him reject the contract he would accept without bonus tax. Otherwise,
if the bank wants to incentivize the manager to exert high effort, it has two options to
draw on: either it incentivizes the manager to exert effort by increasing the short-term
bonus bs in a way such that the manager is fully compensated for the bonus tax, or it
ensures high effort by changing the composition of compensation payments towards the
discounted long-term bonus bl. Either way, a bonus tax is associated with higher com-
pensation payments and thus higher costs for the bank in expectation: either because of
compensating the manager for the bonus tax, or by inducing a suboptimal compensation
composition.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose the government pays a bailout β > 0, but imposes a bonus
tax tb ∈ (0, 1) on short-term bonuses bs. Then, a bonus tax leads to thresholds ρt and ρ̄t
that separate equilibria, with ρt > ρβ and ρ̄t > ρ̄β, and has effects opposed to those of a
bailout. For ρ ∈
(
ρβ, ρ̄t
)
, it induces a reduction of net short-term bonuses accompanied
by an increase of long-term payments. For very high taxes, tb ≥ ρ1+ρ ≡ t
+
b , no short-term
bonuses are paid.
Likewise to the anticipation of a bailout, the bank also changes its contract offers to
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managers when a bonus tax is introduced. While a bailout decreases the bank’s cost of
the manager’s short-termist behavior, a tax on short-term bonuses increases the costs
of paying a short-term bonus to the manager. For the bank, this changes the tradeoff
between short-term and long-term compensation.
However, the bank anticipates that the composition of compensation payments directly
influences the manager’s first order condition with respect to short-termism. Through
this channel, a bonus tax also affects equilibrium short-termism tolerated by the bank
and has effects on the extensive margin of equilibrium selection as well as on equilibrium
choice on the intensive margin as shown in Figure 3.1.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose the government pays a bailout β > 0, but imposes a bonus tax
tb ∈ (0, 1) on short-term bonuses bs. Then,
1. the bonus tax reduces harmful short-termism for a broad range of discount rates ρ ∈(
ρβ, ρ̄t
)
and has no effect for very high (for ρ ≥ ρ̄t) or very low discount rates (for
ρ ≤ ρβ).
2. The bonus tax tb necessary to shift back the lower threshold ρt to its second-best level
ρ differs from the bonus tax t̄b necessary to shift back the upper threshold, i.e. tb |ρt=ρ 6=
t̄b |ρ̄t=ρ̄t.
A comparison between the effects that a bailout imposes (Proposition 3.4) with the
effects a tax on short-term bonuses implies (Propositions 3.5 and 3.6) shows the opposing
impacts both have on compensation payments and short-termism.93
On the extensive margin, the increase of the threshold from ρβ to ρt makes the situation
without short-termism, i.e. a = 0 more likely to occur and, at the same time, the shift
from ρ̄β to ρ̄t reduces the likelihood of a situation with very high short-termism a = ā.
In this respect, a bonus tax imposes an opposing effect than the bailout on the bank, and
increases not only the costs of short-term bonuses, but also the costs of short-termism
per se. By internalizing some of the costs a bailout entails, the government can induce
the bank to set its incentives in such a way that short-termism is going to be avoided in
the presence of a tax where it is strictly positive in the absence of a tax: with taxation,
short-termism will be avoided not only for ρ ∈ (0, ρβ], but will be set to a = 0 also for
ρ ∈ (ρβ, ρt] in equilibrium.
93For welfare as defined in Subsection 3.3.2, a bailout increases welfare reducing (as inefficient) short-
termism while a bonus tax can serve as a converse instrument that increases welfare. Apart from
efficiency concerns, a government with redistributive objectives might use the fact that a bailout
naturally increases E (UP ) while a bonus tax just has the opposite effect on E (UP ). Regarding
the manager, both a bailout and a bonus tax do not affect his expected rents as the participation
constraint (3.7) is always binding.
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However, a bonus tax may strongly affect the composition of incentive payments. Espe-
cially for ρ ∈ (ρβ, ρt], where in absence of a bonus tax short-termism is strictly positive
in equilibrium, the bonus tax makes short-termism unprofitable. In order to prevent
short-termism, the long-term compensation has to increase, which makes it possible for
the bank to reduce the short-term bonus net of taxes that the manager receives while it
maintains effort incentives. Nevertheless, as the manager has to be compensated for the
bonus tax, the gross short-term bonus paid to the manager may even increase due to the
tax duty, depending on the bonus tax.
For very high bonus taxes, paying a short-term bonus may even not be an equilibrium
anymore. For the range in which short-termism is set at a = 0 in equilibrium, i.e. ρ ≤ ρt,
there exists another threshold t+b ≡ ρ1+ρ which specifies whether bs = 0 or bs > 0. For the
first case, consider a very small discount rate, and a small but sufficiently large bonus tax,
such that short-term bonuses become more expensive than long-term bonuses. In this
case, the bank will not make the manager’s incentive constraint with respect to short-
termism a binding anymore, but will concentrate only on the long-term bonus. In detail,
whenever tb ≥ t+b , the short-term bonus is more expensive than a long-term bonus, and
so the principal will pay only an increased long-term bonus bl = (1+ρ)Ix and will abstain
from paying any short-term bonus at all, i.e. the short-term bonus decreases to bs = 0.94
For the second case bs > 0, a short-term bonus is in spite of the bonus tax tb < t+b still
cheaper than the discounted long-term compensation. Therefore, the bank will pay a
short-term bonus bs = δI(1−tb)(1+δ)x and a long-term compensation bl =
(1+ρ)I
(1+δ)x . While the
short-term bonus increases gross and stays constant net of the bonus tax, the long-term
bonus bl does not change.
On the intensive margin, i.e. for ρ ∈
(
ρ̄t, ρ̄β
)
, short-termism decreases as a consequence
of the bonus tax. Higher costs for the short-term bonus induce the bank to shift compen-
sation towards more long-term bonuses. This in turn gives less incentives to the manager
for short-termist behavior who therefore decreases short-termism below the level in the
absence of a bonus tax. For compensation payments, the shift towards the long-term
bonus enables the bank to lower the net short-term bonus. However, the gross short-
term bonus may decrease or increase, depending on the strength of two effects. On the
one hand, the tax duty causes a positive direct effect by which the manager will ask for
a higher gross short-term bonus in order to be equally well off net of taxes. On the other
94Note that in the limit, there must exist some discount rates ρ > 0 for which any tax tb > 0 is above the
threshold t+b . Therefore, there exist discount rates ρ for which any tax tb > 0 yields an equilibrium
short-term bonus bs = 0.
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hand, as the bonus tax makes short-termism less profitable for the bank, the bank will
incentivize less short-termist behavior. This indirect effect causes the negative effects on
the net short-term bonus, which itself affects the gross bonus payment.
Despite its reduced likelihood due to ρ̄t > ρ̄β, there still exists the equilibrium with
very high short-termism if ρ ≥ ρ̄t. Even with a bonus tax, tolerating short-termism
a = ā is still more profitable for the bank than paying a higher long-term bonus bl. As a
result, net compensation will stay constant both for the short-term bonus at (1− tb) bs =√
2kI + k2x2 − kx and the long-term bonus bl = 0. However, the gross short-term bonus
increases proportionately to the bonus tax in order to compensate the manager for the
tax expenses and causes higher costs for the bank.
3.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we modeled a principal-agent structure with two periods in order to
analyze moral hazard both with respect to effort and managerial short-termism. This
was used to study the effects of both a bailout and a tax on short-term bonuses on
short-termism and managerial compensation.
We find that banks may already tolerate harmful and inefficient short-termism in a
second-best equilibrium in the absence of a bailout. This allows a bank to reduce compen-
sation costs for incentivizing the manager to act in its interest. When banks in addition
anticipate a future bailout in case of bankruptcy, in most cases it is profitable for them
to change compensation structure towards higher short-term payments. So, the bank on
the one hand can save on more expensive long-term compensation, while on the other
hand it does not have to bear its cost of increased managerial short-termism. As a result,
a governmental bailout does not only increase the likelihood of short-termist behavior in
general, it also raises existing excessive short-termism even further.
In such a situation, the model suggests the introduction of a tax specifically based on
short-term bonuses. Ceteris paribus, the manager will ask for a higher short-term bonus
gross of taxes to be compensated for the additional tax burden, leading to higher com-
pensation costs for the short-term bonus. In addition, a bonus tax makes managerial
short-termism even less attractive for the bank and thereby induces the bank to tolerate
less of it. It turns out that a bonus tax can reverse the negative effects a bailout entails
on short-termism and compensation. Furthermore, it can be used in order that banks
internalize the social costs their moral hazard causes in the presence of a bailout.
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For real world policy, the results of the model suggest that one reason why we observe
managerial short-termism in banking may be banks’ anticipating governmental bailouts
in case of failure. For banks that can anticipate a bailout, especially if they are too-big-
to-fail, the model also explains the bonus culture we observe in the financial industry
where bankers get paid high cash bonuses based on short-term results. However, a tax on
short-term bonuses may help to reverse the negative effects a bailout entails. It is useful
in reducing the overall likelihood of harmful short-termism and in reducing excessive
short-termism below its level in the absence of a bonus tax. In that sense, a bonus tax is
a good instrument for the government to create a situation where necessary bailouts can
credibly be carried out, but where the anticipation of bailouts does not lead to increased
moral hazard on the banks’ side. In addition, a bonus tax also influences compensation
payments to bankers and thus can be used to reduce the often discussed short-term
payments of bankers.
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Proof of Proposition 1.2
As eSB < e∗ and as (1.13) is concave in eSB, an increase in effort from eSB is welfare
improving. As effort decreases in t, tb and (−α) (Corollaries 1.1 and 1.2), (1.14) is binding
whenever tb > 0 and α < 1. Rearranging (1.10), the right hand side of (π1 − π2) =
1−αt
(1−t)(1−tb)
[
C ′
(
eSB
)
+ eSBC ′′
(
eSB
)]
is monotonically increasing in eSB. Thus, welfare is
maximized by minimizing
(
1−αt
(1−t)(1−tb)
)
.
Part (i): Follows directly from Corollary 1.1, Part (i) and Corollary 1.2, Parts (i) and
(ii).
Part (ii): We solve (1.14) for
α (tb, t) =
t (1− tb)
[
π2 + eSB (π1 − π2)
]
+ tbeSBC ′
(
eSB
)
− (1− tb)B
teSBC ′ (eSB) (A.1)
and insert (A.1) in (1.10). This yields
F = (1− t) (π1 − π2) eSBC ′
(
eSB
)
(A.2)
−
[
C ′
(
eSB
)
+ eSBC ′′
(
eSB
)] [
B + eSBC ′
(
eSB
)
− t
[
π2 + eSB (π1 − π2)
]]
= 0.
Directly, (A.2) only depends on t which proves the substituting nature of α and tb when a
shift in tb has to be compensated by a shift in α (tb, t). In addition, applying the implicit
function theorem on (A.2), it can be found that effort is monotonically increasing in the
CIT, i.e. ∂e
∂t
> 0, as long as t < Φ with
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Φ ≡
B+eSBC′(eSB)−C
′(eSB)+eSBC′′(eSB)
C′′(eSB)+eSBC′′′(eSB) [π1−π2−C′(eSB)−eSBC′′(eSB)]
π2+eSB(π1−π2) . Inserting B
max = π2 +
eSB
[
π1 − π2 − C ′
(
eSB
)]
, it can be shown that Φ ≥ t∗ as long as B is not too high to
consume more than the principal’s profit. Assuming this, t will be set at its maximum t̄.
Part (iii): For tb ≥ 0 and α ≤ 1 optimal taxes are (α∗, t∗b , t∗) as stated in Part (i)
above. As eSBt∗ < e∗, eSBsub > eSBt∗ increases welfare. Starting from α∗ = 1, t∗b = 0,
t∗ = B
π2+eSB(π1−π2)(1−bSB) , and
(
1−αt
(1−t)(1−tb)
)
= 1, a welfare increase can be obtained by
tSBsub > t
∗, tsubb < t∗b = 0 and/or αsub > α∗ = 1 which yields
(
1−αt
(1−t)(1−tb)
)
< 1.
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Proof of Lemma 3.1
In first-best, the bank maximizes
max
a
(x+ a) (πH − bs) + (1− x− a) πL + (x− δa)
(
πH−bl
1+r
)
+
+ (1− x+ δa) πL1+r − A (B.1)
s.t. A+ (x+ a) bs + (x− δa) bl1+ρ ≥ u+ I +
k
2a
2 (B.2)
By paying total expected compensation u + I + k2a
2 as fixed wage, short-term bonus or
a combination of both, the manager’s participation constraint (B.2) is binding. Max-
imizing (B.1) w.r.t. a and considering the restricted domain a ≥ 0 yields aFB =
max
{
0, πH−πL
k
(
1+r−δ
1+r
)}
. Note that the second order condition of (B.1) w.r.t. a for a
maximum is satisfied.
For the welfare maximization, bl will not be used as it is the only compensation method
that negatively affects welfare. Maximizing E (W ) = (x+ a) πH + (1− x− a) πL +
(x− δa) πH1+r + (1− x+ δa)
πL
1+r − I − C (a) w.r.t. α yields the first-best result α
FB.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
Suppose compensation payments are chosen such that the participation constraint
(3.3) and the incentive constraint for effort (3.4) are binding (which will be shown to be
optimal in the proofs of Propositions 3.1 to 3.3). Equations (3.3) and (3.4) imply A = u
and
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bs =
I + k2a
2 − x−δa1+ρ bl
x+ a . (B.3)
For (i): Intuitively, as x−δa > 0 by assumption, (B.3) directly shows that the short-term
bonus bs necessary to induce high effort declines in the level of the long-term bonus bl.
Substituting (B.3) in the manager’s FOC w.r.t. short-termism gives us:
I − k2a
2 − x (1 + δ)1 + ρ bl − xak = 0.
Using the implicit function theorem yields
∂a
∂bl
= − x (1 + δ)
k (x+ a) (1 + ρ) < 0.
For (ii): Using A = u and (B.3), we can compute the bank’s costs of compensating the
manager for effort as a function of bl:
V (bl) = u+ I +
k
2a
2 + (x− δa) ρ− r(1 + r) (1 + ρ)bl (B.4)
Ceteris paribus, especially leaving a unchanged, compensation costs are increasing in the
long-term bonus if ρ > r, i.e. ∂V
∂bl
> 0 if ρ > r. Moreover, the increase is stronger, the
larger ρ is compared to r, i.e.
∂ ∂V
∂bl
∂ρ
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.3
Using ρ = r in (B.4), compensation costs become independent of bl. As part (i) of
Lemma (3.2) does not change, using a long-term bonus to induce effort has no effect on
compensation costs anymore, but still decreases short-termism. As δ > 1 by assumption,
a = 0 is optimal for the bank. The bank is indifferent between paying A = u (from (3.3))
together with only a long-term bonus bl = (1+ρ)Ix , or paying a combination of short-term
and long-term bonus that satisfies both bs ≤ δbl1+ρ (from (3.1)) and bl = (1 + ρ)
(
I
x
− bs
)
(from (3.4)).
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Proof of Propositions 3.1 to 3.3
In order to show the derivation of equilibria only once, the following proofs contain the
parameters πL to analyze the implications of a bailout (by replacing πL with β) and tb
for the analysis of a bonus tax.
The bank maximizes his expected payoff by choosing A, bs and bl:
max
A,bs,bl
(x+ a) (πH − bs) + (1− x− a) πL −A+ [(x− δa) (πH − bl) + (1− x+ δa)πL]
subject to the short-termism constraint
ak = (1− tb) bs − δ
bl
1 + ρ, (B.5)
the effort incentive constraint
(x+ a) (1− tb) bs + (x− δa)
bl
1 + ρ − I −
k
2a
2 ≥ 0, (B.6)
the participation constraint
A+ (x+ a) (1− tb) bs + (x− δa)
bl
1 + ρ − I −
k
2a
2 ≥ u, (B.7)
and the nonnegativity constraints A, bs, bl ≥ 0.
The Lagrangian is then as follows
L = (x+ a) (πH − bs) + (1− x− a) πL − A+ [(x− δa) (πH − bl) + (1− x+ δa) πL]
+λ
[
A+ (x+ a) (1− tb) bs + (x− δa)
bl
1 + ρ − I −
k
2a
2 − u
]
+γ
[
(x+ a) (1− tb) bs + (x− δa)
bl
1 + ρ − I −
k
2a
2
]
+σ
[
(1− tb) bs − δ
bl
1 + ρ − ak
]
, (B.8)
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where λ, γ, and σ are the Lagrangian multipliers w.r.t. the participation constraint, the
effort incentive constraint, and the short-termism constraint, respectively.
In order to fulfill the effort incentive constraint, variable pay is necessary. In addition,
as argumented on page 62, bs < δ bl1+ρ and especially bs = 0 can never be an equilibrium
outcome for the bank if ρ > 0. By increasing bs and simultaneously decreasing bl, the bank
could still induce effort and avoid short-termism, but would reduce total compensation
costs and increase bank profit.95
Thus, there are three possible solutions to the Lagrangian above.
Proposition 3.1 and 3.3:
Suppose that in the optimal solution A > 0, bs > 0 and bl > 0 hold. This implies
∂L
∂A
= ∂L
∂bs
= ∂L
∂bl
= 0, which yields Lagrangian multipliers
λ = 1 (B.9)
γ = ρ (x− δa)
x (1 + δ) +
tb
1− tb
(x+ a) δ
x (1 + δ) (B.10)
σ = (x+ a) (x− δa)(1 + δ)x
(
tb
1− tb
− ρ
)
. (B.11)
For tb1−tb 6= ρ, all constraints must bind.
Proposition 3.1: Suppose a = 0. Algebraic manipulation delivers the optimal contract
with A = u, bs = Ix
δ
(1+δ)(1−tb)
and bl = Ix
1+ρ
1+δ . Substituting the optimal payments and
(B.9) and (B.10) into ∂L
∂a
≤ 0 yields
∂L
∂a
= (πH − πL) (1− δ) + (ρ− tb − tbr)
δI
x (1 + δ) (1− tb)
− σk ≤ 0. (B.12)
Substituting (B.11) in (B.12), ∂L
∂a
≤ 0 is satisfied if and only if
ρ ≤ (πH − πL) (δ − 1) (1 + δ)δI
x
+ xk
+ tb1− tb
≡ ρt. (B.13)
95This is true as long as tb = 0. For tb > 0, a more general proof can be found in the proof of Proposition
3.5.
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For tb = 0, (B.13) gives the threshold
ρ ≡ (πH − πL) (δ − 1) (1 + δ)δI
x
+ xk
, (B.14)
for which the specification given in Proposition 3.1 indeed is an equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3: Suppose a > 0. Algebraic manipulation delivers the optimal contract
with A = u, bs =
akx+δI−δ k2 a
2
(1−tb)(1+δ)x
and bl =
I−akx− k2 a
2
(1+δ)x (1 + ρ). Substituting the optimal
payments and (B.9), (B.10) and (B.11) into ∂L
∂a
= 0 yields
(πH − πL) (1− δ)−
akx+ δI − δ k2a
2
(1− tb) (1 + δ)x
+ δ
I − akx− k2a
2
(1 + δ)x (1 + ρ)
−(x+ a) (x− δa) k
x (1 + δ)
(
tb
1− tb
− ρ
)
= 0 (B.15)
For tb = 0, (B.15) simplifies to (3.5) and yields the optimal a for the equilibrium specified
in Proposition 3.3.
Applying the implicit function theorem on (3.5), ∂a
∂ρ
> 0 can be shown.
Proposition 3.2:
Suppose that in the optimal solution A > 0, bs > 0 and bl = 0 hold. This implies
∂L
∂A
= ∂L
∂bs
= 0 and ∂L
∂bl
≤ 0, which yields Lagrangian multipliers
λ = 1 (B.16)
γ ≤
ρ (x− δa) + δ tb1−tb (x+ a)
x (1 + δ) (B.17)
σ = tb1− tb
(x+ a)− γ (x+ a) . (B.18)
For tb1−tb 6= γ, all constraints must bind. For bs > 0 and bl = 0, a > 0 holds due to (B.5).
Algebraic manipulation delivers the optimal contract with A = u, bs =
√
2kI+k2x2−kx
(1−tb)
and
bl = 0. Short-termism is given by a = ā ≡ 1k
(√
2kI + k2x2 − kx
)
. In order that a > 0 is
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optimal, ∂L
∂a
= 0 must hold. Using the optimal compensation and (B.16) and (B.17), ∂L
∂a
is given by:
∂L
∂a
= (πH − πL) (1− δ)−
ak
(1− tb)
− tb1− tb
(x+ a) k + γ (x+ a) k = 0. (B.19)
Solving (B.19) for γ and substituting in (B.17), ∂L
∂a
= 0 is only satisfied if
ρ ≥ x (1 + δ)
x− δa
ak
1−tb
+ (πH − πL) (δ − 1)
(x+ a) k +
tb
1− tb
≡ ρ̄t. (B.20)
For tb = 0, (B.20) gives the threshold
ρ̄ ≡ x (1 + δ)
x− δa
ak + (πH − πL) (δ − 1)
(x+ a) k , (B.21)
for which the specification given in Proposition 3.2 indeed is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
A bailout of size β is modeled as comparative statics analysis of an increase in πL.
Applying comparative statics on (B.14) and (B.21) with respect to πL yields
∂ρ
∂πL
= − (δ−1)(1+δ)δI
x
+xk < 0 and
∂ρ̄
∂πL
= −x(1+δ)
x−δā
(δ−1)
(x+ā)k , < 0, with
∂2ρ
∂π2L
= ∂2ρ̄
∂π2L
= 0. Note that for
∂ρ̄
∂πL
, ā is independent of πL. Thus, both threshold are linearly decreasing in the size of
the bailout.
A change from ρ to ρβ and ρ̄ to ρ̄β leads to new thresholds that separate the equilibria
denoted in Propositions 3.1 - 3.3. For both cases ρ ≤ ρβ and ρ ≥ ρ̄, the equilibrium
does not change with a bailout. As both compensation and short-termism denoted in
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 are independent of πL, neither compensation payments nor
short-termism changes. This proves part 2.
For part 1, three effects can be distinguished.
1. For ρ ∈
(
ρβ, ρ
)
, the equilibrium without a bailout was characterized by Proposition
3.1 with short-termism a = 0 and compensation A = u, bs = Ix
δ
(1+δ) and bl =
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I
x
1+ρ
1+δ . As ρ decreases to ρ
β in presence of a bailout, for discount rates ρ ∈
(
ρβ, ρ
)
now the equilibrium specified in Proposition (3.3) applies, where short-termism is
strictly positive. For a > 0, the long-term bonus bl =
I−akx− k2 a
2
(1+δ)x (1 + ρ) defined in
Proposition (3.3) is smaller than bl = Ix
1+ρ
1+δ in absence of a bailout. To make the
effort incentive constraint (3.4) binding, bs has to increase. as defined by equation
(3.5).
2. For ρ ∈
(
ρ̄β, ρ̄
)
, the equilibrium without a bailout was characterized by Proposition
3.3 with short-termism a ∈ (0, ā) and bonuses bs =
akx+δI−δ k2 a
2
(1+δ)x > 0 and bl =
I−akx− k2 a
2
(1+δ)x (1 + ρ) > 0. With a bailout, the equilibrium as defined in Proposition
3.2 applies with a = ā, bs =
√
2kI + k2x2 − kx and bl = 0, where bs is higher due
to its sole effort incentive function.
3. For ρ ∈
(
ρ, ρ̄β
)
, without and with a bailout, the equilibrium denoted in Proposi-
tion 3.3 applies. Here, using the implicit function theorem on (3.5), comparative
statics show ∂a
∂πL
= (δ−1)(1+δ)x3kaδρ+(2δρ+1+δ−ρ)kx > 0. For compensation,
∂bs
∂πL
= ∂bs
∂a
∂a
∂πL
=[
k
x(1+δ) (x− δa)
]
∂a
∂πL
> 0 and ∂bl
∂πL
= ∂bl
∂a
∂a
∂πL
=
[
−k(1+ρ)
x(1+δ) (x+ a)
]
∂a
∂πL
< 0 applies as,
by assumption, x− δa > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.5
Part 1: Comparative statics on ρt and ρ̄t defined in equations (B.13) and (B.20),
respectively show that both threshold levels are increasing in a bonus tax, i.e. ∂ρ
t
∂tb
=
1
(1−tb)2
> 0 and ∂ρ̄t
∂tb
= ∂ρ̄t
∂tb
+ ∂ρ̄t
∂a
∂a
∂tb
= 1(1−tb)2 +
(1+δ)xa
(x−δa)(x+a)(1−tb)2
> 0. Note that ∂
2ρt
∂t2
b
> 0 and
∂2ρ̄t
∂t2
b
> 0.
Part 2:
1. For ρ ≥ ρ̄t, the equilibrium is given in the proof of Proposition 3.2 with a = ā. As
for bs =
√
2kI+k2x2−kx
(1−tb)
comparative statics show ∂bs
∂tb
= bs(1−tb) > 0, the gross short-
term bonus proportionally increases with the bonus tax tb, while the net-bonus
(1− tb) bs =
√
2kI + k2x2 − kx stays unchanged.
2. For ρ ≤ ρt, the proof of Proposition 3.1 includes the effects of a small tax. For a
higher tax, the argument that bs = 0 can never be an equilibrium (as stated on
pages 62 and 78) is not true anymore. As long as the costs of the short-term bonus
are smaller as those of the long-term bonus, the equilibrium will be given by A = u,
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bs = Ix
δ
(1+δ)(1−tb)
and bl = Ix
1+ρ
1+δ as denoted in the proof of Proposition 3.1 and the
short-term bonus will increase gross of taxes but stay constant net of taxes.
For taxes above a threshold t+b , the long-term bonus becomes cheaper than the
short-term bonus. Formally, to determine t+b , we use the Lagrangian from equation
(B.8) and search for a threshold where ∂L
∂A
= ∂L
∂bl
= 0 and ∂L
∂bs
≤ 0. Moreover, as
for ρ ≤ ρt equilibrium short-termism is given by a = 0, we can the choice of short-
termism and set a = σ = 0. ∂L
∂A
= 0 yields λ = 1, which we can use with ∂L
∂bl
= 0 to
get γ = ρ. Inserting λand γ in ∂L
∂bs
≤ 0, yields the threshold for which bs = 0 is an
equilibrium, i.e. if and only if
tb ≥
ρ
1 + ρ ≡ t
+
b .
Algebraic manipulation delivers the optimal contract with A = u, bs = 0 and
bl = (1+ρ)Ix . The bonus tax leads to a short-term bonus of zero and a higher long-
term bonus compared to a no-tax scenario.
3. For ρt ≤ ρ ≤ ρ̄t, the equilibrium is given in the proof of Proposition 3.3 with
bs =
akx+δI−δ k2 a
2
(1−tb)(1+δ)x
and bl =
I−akx− k2 a
2
(1+δ)x (1 + ρ). Comparative statics show
∂bs (a)
∂tb
= ∂bs (a)
∂tb
+ ∂bs (a)
∂a
∂a
∂tb
= bs1− tb
+ (x− δa) k(1− tb) (1 + δ)x
∂a
∂tb
R 0, (B.22)
∂bl (a)
∂tb
= ∂bl (a)
∂a
∂a
∂tb
= −(1 + ρ) k(1 + δ)x (x+ a)
∂a
∂tb
> 0. (B.23)
As ∂a
∂tb
< 0 for tb < t+b (as will be shown in the Proof of Proposition 3.6), the
long-term bonus bl is increasing in the bonus tax. For the gross short-term bonus,
two opposing effects influence its reaction on the bonus tax: a positive direct effect
(first term) and a negative indirect effect (second term). For the short-term bonus
net of taxes, only the indirect effect matters.
Proof of Proposition 3.6
Part 1:
1. For ρ ≥ ρ̄t, the equilibrium is given in the proof of Proposition 3.2 with a = ā.
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2. For ρ ≤ ρt, the equilibrium is given in the proof of Proposition 3.1 with a = 0. For
the range of parameters ρ ∈ (ρβ, ρt], a bonus tax changes equilibrium short-termism
from a > 0 in the absence of a tax to a = 0 under taxation.
3. For ρt < ρ < ρ̄t, the equilibrium is given in the proof of Proposition 3.3. Using the
implicit function theorem on (B.15) yields
∂a
∂tb
=
1
(1−tb)2
[
akx+δI−δ k2 a
2
(1+δ)x +
(x+a)(x−δa)k
(1+δ)x
]
k
(1+δ)x
[
−x−δa1−tb − δ (1 + ρ) (x+ a)−
(
tb
1−tb
− ρ
)
(x− δx− 2δa)
] .
As the numerator is clearly positive (note that akx+δI−δ
k
2 a
2
(1+δ)x = (1− tb) bs ≥ 0), the
sign of the denominator determines the sign of ∂a
∂tb
. The denominator is negative,
whenever tb < x(1+δ)+2δρx−ρx+3δaρ2xδ−x+3δa+2δρx−ρx+3δaρ ≡ t̃b holds and especially at tb = 0. Note that
for the denominator to be positive, tb > t+b is a necessary condition.
Moreover, for the range of parameters ρ ∈ [ρ̄β, ρ̄t), a bonus tax changes equilibrium
short-termism from a = ā in the absence of a tax to a < ā under taxation.
Part 2: Using (B.13) and (B.20) and setting πL = tb = 0, we get the threshold levels ρ
and ρ̄ in the absence of a bailout and a bonus tax.
1. By setting ρt equal to ρ, we can derive the bonus tax that is necessary in order that
the bank fully internalizes the costs of the bailout, i.e. tb = (δ−1)(1+δ)βIδ
x
+xk+(δ−1)(1+δ)β .
2. Similarly, by setting ρ̄t equal to ρ̄, we can derive the bonus tax that is neces-
sary in order that the bank fully internalizes the costs of the bailout, i.e. t̄b =
(δ−1)(1+δ)β
2δI−xβ−kx2+2x
√
k2x2+2Ik+xβδ2 .
3. Under our assumptions, tb = t̄b iff Iδx + xk + (δ − 1) (1 + δ) β = 2δI − xβ − kx
2 +
2x
√
k2x2 + 2Ik + xβδ2. This is only the case by strongly constraining δ, β, I, x or
k on certain parameter values.
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